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ONLY  A HANDFUL  of events in this century  are as important  as the cre- 
ation and eventual  collapse of the Soviet Union. That  the Soviet Union 
disappeared  with minimal  loss of life is as extraordinary  as its demise. 
While  the political  changes  have been exceptional, the pace and extent 
of economic  change  have been sweeping,  too. Less than  four  months  af- 
ter the Soviet Union was dissolved, Russia had decisively liberalized 
most prices and was on the road to macroeconomic  stabilization  and 
convertibility  of the ruble.  The budget  deficit  has been cut from  20 to less 
than 10  percent  of gross domestic  product  (GDP).  The inflation  rate  has 
been declining,  after  a price level adjustment.  At the end of April 1992, 
Russia  joined the International  Monetary  Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. Well before the end of the year, Russia will be receiving  IMF fi- 
nancial support to implement  a stabilization  and reform process that 
probably  will include  converting  the ruble  at a fixed rate. 
Rapid  stabilization  in Russia-along  with price and trade liberaliza- 
tion and currency  convertibility-will be an extraordinary  accomplish- 
ment, if it is achieved.  ' But both the emerging  record  of Eastern  Europe 
and the early evidence from Russia suggest that the more challenging 
and ultimately  more important  difficulties  lie elsewhere: in privatiza- 
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1.  Stabilization from the current situation should be judged to be reasonably success- 
ful if the inflation rate is reduced to less than 30 to 40 percent a year; the budget deficit is 
sustainable with non-inflationary financing, implying a level  of 4 to 5 percent of GDP or 
less; and the current account deficit is covered by orderly external financing. 
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tion; in the distribution  sector; in financial,  fiscal, and agricultural  re- 
form-in  short, in the structural  reform  of the economy. 
The cumulative  decline  in output  in the Soviet Union  in 1990  and 1991 
was similar  to that experienced in the major  Eastern European  coun- 
tries, as shown  in table 1. Supply  disruptions  in the oil sector, the break- 
down of the state order  system, and severe disruptions  in inter-republi- 
can trade exacted their toll on economic performance.  For the former 
Soviet Union  (FSU), as for the Eastern  European  countries,  exports  and 
imports  declined  sharply  in 1991.  However, in the FSU, much  of the de- 
cline-one-third  of exports-resulted  from domestic supply disrup- 
tions, particularly  in the oil industry. 
Russia embarked  on its reform  program  at the end of 1991  facing an 
impressive  array  of problems.  First, as already  noted, output  had  fallen 
by nearly  20 percent. Moreover, the inflationary  overhang  produced  a 
350 to 400 percent increase in prices within a month after prices were 
liberalized  in January  1991.  Second, the Group  of Seven industrialized 
democracies (G-7) was intent on getting the 15 republics  to recognize 
their  "joint  and  several"  responsibility  for the Soviet Union's $80  billion 
external debt and seemingly uninterested  in providing  direct financial 
support  for economic reform. 
Third,  the incoming  policymakers  had  to assemble  a civil service and 
administration  from  the remnants  of the Soviet system at the same time 
as they were planning  their reforms. (In this respect, the Russian  gov- 
ernment,  based in Moscow, was in much  better  shape  than  the other  re- 
publics.) The breakdown  of authority  in the Soviet Union also has ex- 
tended to authority  within  Russia, with its sixteen autonomous  regions 
and subregional  units reaching  for greater  independence-the  more so 
the greater  their resource riches. Even today, reports suggest that the 
reach of the central  Russian  administration  is limited  and that regional 
and  local officials  freely ignore  instructions  from  central  authorities. 
Fourth, trading  and currency  relations  among  the republics  are in a 
state of flux. The republics  of the new Commonwealth  have agreed in 
principle  to continue  using  the ruble  for two years, but there  is no doubt 
that Ukraine is  already implicitly introducing a  separate currency 
through  its coupon  system and  little  doubt  that  it will explicitly  introduce 
a separate  currency  later  this year. In addition,  the entire  range  of politi- 
cal issues following  the breakup  of the Soviet Union, including  the dis- Stanley Fischer  79 
Table 1.  The Economic Performance of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,  199s91a 
Percent,  except  where indicatedb 
Soviet 
Macroeconomic  indicator  CSFRC  Hungaty  Poland  Romnania  Union 
Output growth 
1990  - 1  -4  -  12  -7  -4 
l99ld  -16  -8  -8  -12  -13 
( -9)  (-8)  (-4)  (-10)  ( -4) 
Inflation 
1990  18  33  249  5  20 
1991  54  33  60  223  100 
Budget deficit 
1990  0.3  0.1  -  3.5  0.3  8.3 
1991  2.1  3.9  5.7  1.4  20.0 
Year IMF program began  1991  1991  1990  1991 
Sources: For Eastern European countries, Bruno (1992, table 2). For the Soviet  Union, PlaniEconi  Report, December 
9,  1991 (nos.  43-44). 
a. Data for 1991 are estimated  based on the first three quarters of the year. 
b. The budget deficit is expressed  as a percent of GDP.  All other figures are percent per year. 
c.  Czech  and Slovak  Federal Republic. 
d. Data in parentheses  are the change in exports as a fraction of GDP and estimate  the direct impact of the decline 
in exports  on output growth. 
position  of the armed  forces and  nuclear  weapons, as well as the owner- 
ship  of assets and  liabilities,  must  be dealt  with. 
The 20 percent decline of output in the republics  of the FSU by the 
end of 1991  occurred  even before reform  had started.  A key question  is 
whether  the republics  of the FSU will have to pay a further  post-stabili- 
zation  price  similar  to that  of Eastern  Europe-about 20 percent  of out- 
put?  Or,  because  the 1991  decline  in output  in both  the FSU and  Eastern 
Europe  was heavily affected by the collapse of the Council  for Mutual 
Economic  Assistance (CMEA), is it more likely that most of the price 
has already  been paid? 
Other  republics  of the FSU generally  lag behind Russia in their re- 
form  efforts  (although  there  has been progress  in some areas  in some re- 
publics, such as privatization  in Armenia).  Because of Russia's domi- 
nance  and to confine  this paper  to manageable  proportions,  I will focus 
on stabilization  and reform  in Russia. First, I will briefly  describe  Rus- 
sia's current  economic situation. Then I will review Russia's reform 
strategy  in light  of the Eastern  European  experience. I will then take up 80  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
in turn  questions  of inter-republican  trade  and policy coordination  and 
the role of external  aid. 
The Russian Economy in the Former Soviet Union 
Russia accounts for three-quarters  of the land mass and more than 
half the population of the former FSU. The republic is the world's 
largest country by size and has the world's fifth largest population. 
Meaningful  estimates  of its real  GDP  at the time  of transition  are  difficult 
to come by or credit. Use of the black market  exchange rate implies 
numbers-such as $150  per capita  a year-that  are too low to be believ- 
able. More  realistically,  Abram  Bergson  estimates  that on a purchasing 
power basis, per capita  GDP  in the Soviet Union in 1985  was somewhat 
below the CIA's estimate  of 42 percent  of the U.S. level, but  well above 
28 percent  of the U.S. level.2  Treating  the estimate as 35 percent  of the 
U.S. level would have put Russian  per capita  GDP at about 38 percent 
of the U.S. level, in the range  of such low-income European  countries 
as Greece, Portugal,  and  Spain.  Given  the subsequent  declines  in output 
in Russia  and  the increases  in output  elsewhere, Bergson's  starting  point 
would place Russian  real (purchasing  power)  per capita  GDP in 1991  at 
a level similar  to Mexico's. 
The World Bank, which uses estimates of dollar GDP to compare 
countries  and  establish  eligibility  for different  programs  and  facilities, is 
likely to estimate a per capita dollar  GDP for Russia in the same range 
as Poland-about $1,800  in 1989-which is also at about  the same level 
as Mexico.3 
Table  2 presents  data  on the five most populous  former  Soviet repub- 
lics. The Russian  economy, because of its size and resources, was the 
least dependent  of the Soviet republics  on inter-republican  trade;  its en- 
ergy resources  ensured  that  it had a greater  share  of exports outside the 
FSU than  the other  republics.4  Russia  is more urban  and more  industri- 
2.  Bergson (1991). 
3.  Joint Study  (1990,  p.  51) estimates  the  Soviet  Union's  1989 per capita GDP  at 
$1,780, using the exchange  rate that prevailed at the time,  1.8 rubles to the dollar. This 
number was chosen  in part because  it put the Soviet  Union  at about the same level  as 
Poland. 
4.  The data may exaggerate  Russia's  share of exports  abroad because  goods  from 
other republics tended to be marketed through Russia. Stal'aey Fischer-  81 
Table 2.  Basic Data for the Most Populous Republics of the Former Soviet Uniona 
Percent,  except  where indicated 
Soviet 
Itemn  Ruissia  Ukr-ainie  Uzbekistani  Klalaz  akstani  Bel/aiits  Uniion 
Population 
Millions  148.0  51.8  20.3  16.7  10.3  288.6 
Percent of total  51.3  18.0  7.0  5.8  3.6  100.0 
Percent urban  74  67  41  57  66  66 
Index of per capita 
net output  119  90  47  74  117  100 
Index of per capita 
income  110  96  62  93  102  100 
Infant mortalityb  17.8  13.0  37.7  25.9  11.8  22.7 
Share of net output  61.1  16.2  3.3  4.3  4.2  100.0 
Share of industrial output  63.7  17.2  2.4  2.5  4.2  100.0 
Share of agricultural output  50.3  17.9  5.5  6.4  5.1  100.0 
Exports as a percent of net 
material productc 
Inter-republican  18.0  39.1  43.2  30.9  69.6  29.3 
Abroad  8.6  6.7  7.4  3.0  6.5  7.5 
Source: Joint Study (1991, vol.  1, various tables). 
a.  All data are for 1988, except  population data, which are shown  as of January 1, 1990. 
b.  Infant mortality is the number of deaths per thousand births. 
c.  In  1988, inter-republican exports  were  21.1  percent  of  Soviet  GDP  and exports  abroad were  5.4  percent  of 
Soviet GDP.  GDP data are not available at the republican level. 
Table 3.  Structure of Employment in the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and West Germany, 1988a 
Percent of total employment 
Soviet  United  West 
Sector  Union  States  Germany 
Agriculture  20.2  2.9  5.3 
Manufacturing  23.6  18.5  32.2 
Construction  9.3  6.6  6.6 
Wholesale  and retail trade  6.1  22.1  15.1 
Finance  and insurance  0.5  11.3  6.7 
Community services  25.9  31.4  25.9 
Other  14.4  7.2  8.2 
Source: Joint Study (1991, vol.  2, p.  196). Data are adjusted to ensure compatibility. 
a. Data for West Germany are for 1986. 
alized  and  has a higher  per capita  income than  most of the other repub- 
lics. Table  2 also clearly  shows the lower  level of economic  development 
of the Central  Asian republics,  represented  by Khazakstan  and Uzbe- 
kistan. 
The structure  of employment  in the Soviet Union was similar  to that 
of other centrally  planned  economies. However, as table 3 shows, the 2 
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Soviet system differed  from market  economies especially by the small 
share  of resources  in the distribution  (wholesale  and retail  trade)  sector 
and in the financial  sector.5  Economic transformation  in Russia is cer- 
tain to draw  more resources into the distribution  and financial  sectors. 
It also will  gradually  draw  workers  out of the agriculture  sector. Russia's 
share  of employment  in manufacturing  is comparable  to that  in Western 
European  countries  and may not change  much  as economic restructur- 
ing occurs. 
The domestic macroeconomic  disequilibria  facing the new Russian 
government  at the end of 1991  are summarized  in table 1. In the latter 
half of 1991,  Russia  took over obligations  of the Soviet government,  in- 
cluding  the army  payroll  and  the task of printing  money. 
Russia's balance  of payments  situation  at the end of 1991  is difficult 
to appraise.  Much  trade  with countries  outside  the FSU was carried  out 
in nonconvertible  currencies at artificial  exchange rates and prices. 
Moreover,  the prospects  for trade  with  other  republics  after  the breakup 
of the Soviet Union are extremely unclear. Table 4 presents the most 
recent data.6  These show the Soviet Union sharply  reducing  its current 
account  deficit  between 1990  and 1991  and  Russia  moving  from  a current 
account  deficit  to a sizable  surplus  between 1990  and 1991.  The  improve- 
ment  in the current  account  results  mainly  from  a greater  collapse of im- 
ports  from  the CMEA  countries  than  exports  to them;  however, imports 
from the countries with convertible currencies also declined sharply. 
During  1991,  the Soviet Union received net credits larger  than its bal- 
ance of payments  surplus. 
Omitted  from  the trade  data  for Russia  in table  4 are any estimates  of 
inter-republican  trade  in 1990  and 1991.  Russia's current  account  in in- 
5. The same statement  applies  to Russia, although  it is more industrialized  and less 
agricultural  than  was the Soviet Union. Data  comparable  to those in table  3 are not avail- 
able  for Russia.  An alternative  data  set, which shows industry  and  construction  together 
employing  38 percent  of the Soviet labor  force, puts  Russian  employment  in that  sector  at 
42 percent.  Comparable  data  for the agriculture/forestry  sector  are 19  percent  for the So- 
viet Union  and 14  percent  for Russia.  See Joint  Study  (1991,  vol. 1, p. 219). 
6. From  PlanEcon  Report,  March  13, 1992  (nos. 9-10), based on data  that  PlanEcon 
describes  as having  been prepared  by the Russian  government  in accordance  with stan- 
dard  IMF  methodology  and the cooperation  of IMF experts. However,  PlanEcon  warns 
that  the data  may  exaggerate  the strength  of Russia's  export  performance.  Note also that 
the share  of imports  and  exports  attributed  to Russia  in table  4 is constant.  (I am grateful 
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ter-republican  trade,  evaluated  at actual  prices, was probably  in surplus 
in 1991;  at world  prices, Russia  would have had a large  surplus  in inter- 
republican  trade.7  However, the volume of inter-republican  trade cer- 
tainly  declined  sharply  in 1991.  For 1992,  the questions  must  be at what 
prices  inter-republican  trade  will be carried  out, what  capacity  the other 
republic  will have to pay for imports, and how much mutual  credit re- 
publics can extend to one another to support trade. Inter-republican 
trade  is likely to continue  to implode. 
The export  and  import  rows in table  4 show a large  decline in trade  in 
the nonconvertible  area  between 1990  and 199  1.8 Some of the key export 
and  import  commodities  are shown  in table  5. Exports  of the single  most 
important  commodity-oil-declined  by nearly half, a rate of decline 
that well exceeds the estimated  percentage  decline in oil production  of 
10 to 15 percent.9  Thus the decline in oil exports in 1991  must have re- 
sulted  from  both supply  disruptions  in the Soviet Union  and  demand  dis- 
ruptions  in the former  CMEA  countries.  Corresponding  to the decline  in 
exports (which, as noted above, was mainly  in the nonconvertible  area) 
are sharp  falls in imports  of machinery  and raw materials  (not shown), 
as well as consumer  goods. Imports  of basic foodstuffs did not drop as 
sharply. 
In the debt agreement  reached with the G-7 at the end of 1991, the 
Commonwealth  of Independent States (CIS) governments accepted 
"joint  and  several"  responsibility  for  the Soviet Union's debts. This  obli- 
gation  must  be more  binding  on Russia  than  on the small  republics.  Rus- 
sia's share  of the debt (if the other republics  pay their shares)  is 61 per- 
cent, orjust under  $50  billion.  By the conventional  criteria,  Russia  is not 
severely indebted.  In 1991,  Russian  exports  to the convertible  currency 
area  were $25 billion10  and exports to the former  CMEA  countries  were 
$17 billion. With  a debt-to-exports  ratio  of 200 percent  (this is an upper 
bound),  the ratio  for Russia  for this indicator  would be in the middle  of 
7. Joint  Study  (1991,  vol. 1, p. 227)  shows a small  Russian  surplus  in inter-republican 
trade  for 1987  that turns  into a massive surplus  when trade  is evaluated  at world  prices. 
See table  8. 
8. As pointed  out by Larry  Summers,  this shift  may  be exaggerated  by the move  of the 
former  East  Germany  from  the nonconvertible  to the convertible  area. 
9. The absolute  decline  in production  appears  to have been about  the same  as the de- 
cline in exports. 
10. PlanEcon Report, March  13, 1992  (nos. 9-10), table  20. Stanley Fischer-  85 
Table 5.  Russian Exports and Imports,  1990-91 
Percent 
Item  1990  1991  chlange 
Exports 
Crude oil (million barrels per day)  2.2  1.1  -  50 
Refined oil (million barrels per day)  1.0  0.9  -  11 
Natural gas (billion cubic meters)  109.0  104.5  -4 
Hard coal (million metric tons)  35.4  23.9  -  32 
Wood (million cubic meters)  28.0  19.0  -33 
TV sets  (millions)  1.7  0.7  -58 
Impor-ts 
Equipment for food 
and light industry  ...  ...  -  80 
Grain (million metric tons)a  30  136  - 7 
Leather  shoes  (million pairs)  136  40  -71 
Pharmaceuticals  (billion rubles)  3.1  1.8  -43 
Source: PlanEconi Report,  March 13, 1992 (nos.  9-10),  p. 8. 
a. Data for grain are for the first nine months only. 
the range of the moderately  indebted countries, as designated  by the 
World  Bank;  so too would be the interest-to-exports  ratio.11  The disor- 
ganization  that  will accompany  economic restructuring  will temporarily 
affect  the economy's ability  to export  and  increase  its need for imports. 
However, in the medium  run, Russia should  be able to service its debts 
easily. 
Russia's Reform Strategy 
In formulating  its economic stabilization  and reform strategy, the 
Russian  government  has been able to draw  on the well-known  Soviet re- 
form plans that were intensively discussed (and rejected by President 
Gorbachev)  between 1989 and 1991, as well as analysis by Western 
1  1. The  World  Bank  categorizes  a country's  indebtedness  on the basis  of four  criteria: 
debt-to-GNP  ratio  (30 to 50 percent);  debt-to-exports  (165  to 275 percent);  debt service- 
to-exports  (18 to 30 percent);  and interest-to-exports  (12 to 20 percent).  A country  is se- 
verely indebted  if at least three of its four debt indicators  exceed the upper  limit  of the 
moderately  indebted  range.  (See World  Bank, World  Debt Tables,  1991-92.) 86  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
economists and the experience of Eastern  European,  Latin American, 
and  other stabilization  programs.  12 
The standard  reform  prescription  is for a five-point  strategy,  moving 
as rapidly  as possible on all  fronts:  macroeconomic  stabilization,  requir- 
ing both a budget  that is nearly  balanced  and tight control over credit; 
liberalization  of the prices  of most goods; current  account  convertibility 
of the currency;  privatization;  and the creation  of a social safety net.  '3 
At the same time, the government  should be putting  in place the legal 
framework  for a market  economy. 
The best known of the Soviet reform  plans is the Shatalin  500-Day 
Plan.  14 The Shatalin  Plan  proposed  a detailed  program  that would have 
transformed  the Soviet economy into a market economy within 500 
days, starting  on October  1, 1990:  by now, the program  would  have been 
completed. The sequencing of the Shatalin Plan differs from the se- 
quencing  of plans now being implemented  in Russia and Eastern Eu- 
rope. The first 100  days would have been devoted to privatization  and 
stabilization.  Small  businesses, housing, and vehicles would have been 
privatized  and  large  companies  corporatized.  Revenues from  privatiza- 
tion were expected to make  a serious  contribution  to balancing  the bud- 
get. A market  infrastructure  was to be put in place. Existing  state orders 
and  contracts  were to run  through  the middle  of 1991.  Wages  were to be 
indexed.  The multiple  exchange  rate  system was to be replaced  by a sin- 
gle rate. Imports  of consumer  goods were to be increased. The Soviet 
Union was to have cut back  foreign  aid. 
Prices  were to have been liberalized  only after  macroeconomic  stabi- 
lization  had been assured  and the market  infrastructure-including  pri- 
vatization-had  been put in place. Between days 100 and 250, prices 
would have been liberalized,  larger  firms  would have been privatized, 
and the first  stage of agrarian  reform  would have been completed. Dur- 
ing the next phase, lasting  to day 400, privatization  would have contin- 
12. In his review  of Eastern  European  reform  experiences,  Bruno  (1992)  identifies  six 
key issues:  the extent  of the initial  price  jump;  the output  decline;  the fiscal  balance  and  its 
sustainability;  the problem  of financial  reform;  the problem  of the interim  regime  for so- 
cially owned enterprises;  and macroeconomic  policies, including  the choice of the ex- 
change  rate  regime  and  income  policies. 
13. See, for example, Fischer and Gelb (1991),  Joint Study (1990),  and Lipton and 
Sachs  (1990). 
14. The Shatalin  Plan  is also called Transition to Market and  has been translated  into 
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ued, antimonopoly  activity would have been strengthened,  and prices 
would have been fully liberalized.  Internal  ruble convertibility  was to 
have been achieved. The plan envisaged widespread  bankruptcies  and 
saw the need for measures  to support  the unemployed.  The last 100  days 
were envisaged  as the beginning  of the upswing. 
The Shatalin  group  believed that a price  jump at the start  of a reform 
plan  would  be politically  unacceptable:  one reason  they started  with  pri- 
vatization  was their  belief that asset sales could help remove the mone- 
tary overhang.  The Shatalin  Plan  placed much less weight on the need 
for early convertibility  than do most Western  plans. The plan also did 
not emphasize external assistance, believing that the Soviet Union 
could manage largely on its own. The plan recognized the need for 
greater  republican  autonomy  and expressed concern about  maintaining 
a single economic space. Read in the light of hindsight,  the plan  did not 
recognize the imminence  of the threat  of collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, the plan's 500-day  target was unrealistically  ambitious, al- 
though  the notion  of a sequenced  program  makes sense. 
In any event, the Russian  government  started  its reforms  by liberaliz- 
ing prices-well  before it had any assurance that fiscal and monetary 
policy were consistent with macroeconomic  stability. The normal  pre- 
scription  is first or simultaneously  to establish  macroeconomic  control 
and  then  to liberalize  prices. However, that  prescription  applies  to coun- 
tries where most resources are allocated through  functioning  markets 
and where price liberalization  means removing  incomplete price con- 
trols  and  reducing  tariffs;  this was not the situation  in Russia.  There, the 
choice was between liberalizing  prices and risking hyperinflation  or 
maintaining  price controls and exacerbating  shortages. In weighing  its 
decision, the government  no doubt took into account the fact that a 
growing  proportion  of transactions  were being conducted  in black mar- 
kets, so that the effective choice to a considerable  extent was between 
hidden  and open inflation.  The government  must also have taken into 
account  the unavailability  of external  resources  to help finance  the bud- 
get and stabilize  the currency.  Moreover,  by taking  a radical  and virtu- 
ally irreversible  step, it signaled  that it meant  what it said about  radical 
reform. 
Obvious problems  with the standard  strategy derive from the diffi- 
culty of doing everything  at once. The Shatalin  Plan's intention  to put 
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based on the fear of perverse supply responses by managers  of state- 
owned enterprises (more accurately, enterprises  whose ownership is 
not well defined). But privatization  before liberalizing  prices is also 
problematic  because it is impossible  to value  firms  for sale when current 
prices and  profits  provide  little guide  to future  performance. 
I will turn now to other elements of the standard  strategy, leaving 
aside the safety net. 
Macroeconomic  Stabilization 
Much still must be done to secure macroeconomic  stabilization  in 
Russia. The two essentials are fiscal consolidation  and a tightening  of 
monetary  and  credit  policy. The Russian  government  was able  to reduce 
the budget  deficit  by more  than 10  percent  of GDP  by cutting  subsidies, 
defense expenditures,  and  investment  spending.  But its efforts  to collect 
taxes have been less successful, so that  a planned  budget  deficit  of 1  per- 
cent of GDP in the first  quarter  of 1992  will become an actual  deficit of 
near 10  percent. 
As table  6 shows, the Soviet tax system relied  primarily  on profits  and 
turnover  taxes, the former  collected mostly at the union  level, the latter 
more at the republican  level. On the expenditure  side, subsidies-pro- 
vided mostly at the republican  level-took  up about 20 percent of the 
budget  and 10  percent  of GDP. The Russian  government,  in its initial  at- 
tempt  at macroeconomic  stabilization,  cut subsidies  and  relied  on a gen- 
eralized  28 percent sales (or value-added)  tax to close the budget  gap. 
The sales tax should  have been collectible  through  the same  channels  as 
before, and profits  and export taxes also should have been paid to the 
Russian government. However, revenues have fallen short of projec- 
tions, partly  because of the decline  in exports, partly  because the parlia- 
ment  exempted  food from  taxation,  and  partly  because of poor tax com- 
pliance. 
In the short  run, fiscal stabilization  will require  further  spending  cuts 
and  increased  revenues. The key to budget  balance  lies in taxing  oil ex- 
ports. The deficit could be closed if a planned 40 percent export tax 
could be collected, especially if recent declines in oil production  could 
be reversed. Over the longer run, structural  fiscal reform  is needed to 
move away from the fiscal structure  inherited  from the Soviet Union. 
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Table 6.  Soviet Revenue and Expenditure by Government Level,  1989 
Percent 
Distribution  by government  level 
Fiscal  item  Total  Union  Republican  Local 
Revenues 
Total revenue  100.0  53  26  21 
Tax revenue  94.6  53  27  20 
Income  taxes  41.0  54  17  29 
Profit taxes  30.4  59  20  22 
Personal income  taxes  10.6  39  11  50 
Turnover taxes  28.2  14  59  27 
Alcohol  10.3  .  .  .  ...  . 
Social  insurance  8.4  84  16  0 
Taxes  on foreign trade  14.8  100  .  .  . 
Expenditlures 
Total expenditure  100.0  51  33  16 
Economy  41.7  37  51  12 
Investment  14.2  61  20  19 
Price compensationa  13.8  29  67  3 
Procurement pricesa  6.6  .  .  .  100  .  . . 
Social  and cultural  29.0  26  37  37 
Defense  15.7  100  ...  ... 
Source: Joint Study (1991,  vol.  1, p. 280-82).  Revenues  in  1989 were  393.9 billion rubles and were 41 percent  of 
Soviet  GDP.  Expenditures  were 480.1 billion rubles and were 50 percent of GDP. 
a. Both price compensation  and procurement prices are subsidy items. Most subsidies  went to agriculture, primarily 
to support basic food  prices.  Cross-subsidization  among firms is not recorded in the budget. 
of reform,  simplicity  and collectibility  are key criteria.  15 As part  of the 
reform,  penalties for tax evasion will have to be strengthened  so that 
Russia  does not descend into the former  Latin  American  trap  where no 
one pays taxes, no one is punished,  the budget  is chronically  in deficit, 
and  inflation  is perennial. 
The issue of monetary  or credit  policy in Russia is mired  in a dispute 
between the Central  Bank of Russia and the Finance Ministry  over the 
need for tight credit. The central  bank, with the support  of parliament, 
has argued  that  tightening  credit  now will merely  lead to unemployment 
and bankruptcies  without achieving any positive results. The Finance 
Ministry  wants  the central  bank  to tighten  credit  as part  of the stabiliza- 
tion program. 
15. Largely  on these  grounds,  McLure  (1991)  argues  for  a consumption-based  tax. See 
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Much of what happened  in early 1992 was standard  buck-passing. 
However, there are also important  issues of the reform  strategy.  Budg- 
etary stabilization  alone cannot stop inflation  if the central  bank  contin- 
ues to expand  the stock of credit  by lending  to the private  sector. Both 
the quantity  and cost of central  bank  credit  matter:  the Central  Bank  of 
Russia has so far been lending  at a very negative  real rate, which is not 
surprising  when a price level change  is occurring.  However, there is no 
sign that the central  bank is willing to move the real interest rate to a 
positive level even when and  if inflation  recedes. 
The central  bank  has argued  that it is essential not to starve existing 
firms of finance. The argument  for generous credit at this time would 
start  from  the view that credit  policy cannot  be divorced  from issues of 
enterprise  reform  and  regional  policy at this stage. Enforcement  of tight 
credit  constraints  could lead to the closing of enterprises.  In the current 
distorted  price and financial  systems, the wrong  firms  might  close. Fur- 
ther, given the geographical  concentration  of industry,  such closings- 
even if they were justified on economic grounds-could  devastate the 
economies of entire  regions,  as happened,  for instance, in the shipbuild- 
ing regions  of the former  East Germany.  The standard  prescription-to 
formulate  a regional  policy and  finance  it through  the budget-is  unreal- 
istic, given the government's  inability  to raise revenues. The provision 
of cheap credit  is a substitute  for an articulated  and  financed  restructur- 
ing and  regional  policy. 
This argument  is not in principle  incorrect.  It certainly  increases  the 
urgency of moving ahead on economic restructuring-primarily  priva- 
tization-and the formulation  of regional  policies. However, there  is no 
doubt  that  credit  policy should  be tightened  now. Prices  have been liber- 
alized and  firms  need to begin  to face a financial  bottom  line. This would 
encourage  normal  supply  responses, including  the disgorging  of inven- 
tories-a  process that would help reverse expectations of rising  prices 
and move goods into distribution  channels. The argument  that a tight- 
ening  of credit  policies will lead to massive unemployment  may become 
relevant within a year if no industrial  restructuring  takes place. How- 
ever, the fact is that  few firms  in the reforming  Eastern  European  coun- 
tries have been closed and  unemployment  has increased  only slowly. 
In the near  term, monetary  policy will have to support  the stabiliza- 
tion effort if stabilization  is to succeed and to attract  Western  financial 
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ready  be tightening  credit;  there  are some reports  that  credit  growth  was 
slow in February  1992.  Second, an explicit monetary  policy rule-such 
as a limit on domestic credit creation-or  maintenance  of a fixed ex- 
change  rate, could be embodied  in the expected IMF agreement.  Third, 
the interest rate may be raised to positive real levels-although  this is 
not a sufficient  policy unless accompanied  by central  bank  refusal  to roll 
over debts. Nonetheless, if the policy conflict  continues,  President  Yelt- 
sin will have to come down one way or the other  on the issue. 
Incomes  Policy 
Taxes on excess wage increases  have been used in Poland.  One  argu- 
ment for such tax-based  incomes policies advanced  in the 1970s  is that 
these taxes mitigate an externality in the wage-setting process.'6 A 
stronger  argument  in reforming  socialist  economies is that so long  as the 
ownership  of enterprises  is ambiguous,  firms  will tend to pay out exces- 
sive amounts  to workers  and  other  stakeholders.  The requirement  in Po- 
land that firms  pay dividends  to the government  also responds to this 
concern,  but would  not by itself prevent  decapitalization  of the firm.  An 
equally  powerful  argument  derives  from  the potential  dynamic  inconsis- 
tency of anti-inflationary  policy. A government  committed  to control- 
ling inflation  should not accommodate  wage-cost pressures on prices. 
However, if wages do rise, the government  that resists such pressures 
has to create unemployment,  which it is loathe to do. Rather  than  allow 
itself to be put in that position, the government  seeks to prevent it by 
taxing  excess wage increases. 
Opponents argue that market forces should be left to determine 
wages. But wage setting in government-owned  firms is not a market 
process. As in Poland, the tax should not apply to firms  in the private 
sector, thereby providing  an incentive to privatize. It is also true that 
because firms  can compensate  workers  in many ways, evasion will be 
widespread.  Nonetheless, the balance  of the argument  favors the use of 
a tax on excess wage increases  in Russia.  17 
16. Seidman  (1978). 
17. Blanchard  and  Layard  (1991)  discuss  some  difficulties  in the implementation  of the 
Polish  excess wage  tax, particularly  that  it allowed  a period  of slower-than-permitted  wage 
increases  to be followed  by a catchup,  in which  wages  could  increase  temporarily  at more 
than  the target  inflation  rate. This difficulty  could be handled  by rebasing  the reference 
wage  each  month.  (I am  grateful  to Olivier  Blanchard  for discussion  of this issue.) 92  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
The Exchange  Rate  and Ctirrent Account  Convertibility 
One attraction  of currency  convertibility  at a fixed exchange rate- 
the third  element  in the standard  package-is  that  there  would then  be a 
clear  monetary  policy rule:  to conduct  monetary  policy so as to maintain 
the exchange  rate.18  This would certainly  help, but it would not be suffi- 
cient; as experience  all over the world  shows, countries  can hold an ex- 
change rate fixed for some time, even though  they pursue  policies that 
ensure it will have to be devalued  at some future  point. Thus, the nomi- 
nal anchor of the exchange rate would have to be supplemented  by a 
nominal anchor on, say, domestic credit, so that domestic inflation 
would not first  erode competitiveness  and then force a devaluation,  as 
often has happened-including in Poland  in 1991.  19 
The usual  argument  for a fixed  exchange  rate  rule  during  stabilization 
is that it ensures that the supply of money will adjust  automatically  to 
relevant  demand  shifts at a time when shifts in the demand  function  are 
difficult  to predict.20  However, this argument  assumes that there are no 
capital  controls  and  would not apply  to the reforming  formerly  socialist 
economies. The relevant  macroeconomic  arguments  in Russia are that 
the exchange  rate rule is one that the central  bank  can understand,  and 
that the fixed exchange rate provides direct stabilization  to the price 
level-both  because it is a highly  visible price whose stability  can help 
stabilize  expectations,  and because it ensures that  the prices of imports 
will rise only at the foreign  rate of inflation  (changes  in domestic mark- 
ups aside). 
Equally  important  is the microeconomic  argument  that  convertibility 
allows the country  to import  the appropriate,  world  price system.21 Es- 
sentially, current  account  convertibility  is the same thing  as trade  liber- 
18. See Greene and Isard (1991)  for a review of the role of convertibility  in trans- 
forming  socialist  economies. 
19. However, I am not arguing  that  the exchange  rate should  be held fixed  no matter 
what. The exchange  rate  anchor  is most needed  in the early  stages  of stabilization  and  re- 
form  and may have to be moved to a crawling  peg or other  system after  some time. The 
most important  objectives  of exchange  rate  policy must  be to avoid significant  overvalu- 
ation  of the currency. 
20. Fischer  (1986). 
21. Strictly  speaking,  this argument  does not require  a fixed  exchange  rate.  However, 
exchange  rate fluctuations  would weaken  the role of convertibility  in helping  determine 
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alization.  It allows  individuals  and  enterprises  to buy and  sell foreign  ex- 
change freely as the counterpart  to imports  and exports of goods and 
services. Current  account convertibility  is not consistent with wide- 
spread  quantitative  restrictions  on trade  or foreign  exchange licensing, 
but could be consistent with tariffs and export subsidies or taxes. In 
most reforming  Eastern  European  countries, tariffs  have been reduced 
to lower  and  more  uniform  levels than  was typical  in the reforming  coun- 
tries of Latin  America.22 
If the exchange  rate is to be fixed, its level will matter  for the subse- 
quent course of inflation.23  Relative wages at current  market  exchange 
rates  are well below levels likely to prevail  if the currency  stabilizes:  the 
market  is thin; most of trade  is not conducted  at that rate; and the rate 
can be moved by small  amounts  of foreign  exchange. Setting  the initial 
exchange  rate at about  the current  market  rate (for  example, 120  rubles 
per  dollar)  would  create  an inflationary  shock  and  would  not provide  any 
competition  from  imports.  It would  be preferable  to set the initial  rate  at 
a level that  (while  allowing  for some subsequent  inflation)  would  put  dol- 
lar wages in the vicinity of $50 to $100  per month. Whether  this can be 
done will depend  on the availability  of a stabilization  fund  and other  ex- 
ternal  financing  and  on the authorities'  ability  to prevent  capital  flight  by 
exporters. 
There has been much discussion of the choice between gradualism 
and shock treatment  in Eastern  European  reform.  The issue is in most 
respects irrelevant  in the case of Russia.24  For countries  that start  with 
a massive macroeconomic  disequilibrium,  rapid  stabilization  is essen- 
tial. So is rapid  price liberalization  when shortages are pervasive, as 
they were in Russia. Some elements of a social safety net must  be put in 
place immediately  to ensure  that stabilization  does not cause excessive 
hardship. 
There  are two areas  in which gradualism  is a viable option:  trade  lib- 
22. Rodrik  (1992)  reviews  Eastern  European  experience.  He does not find  much  evi- 
dence for the view that  foreign  competition  disciplines  domestic  price rises (which  is an 
essential  part  of the view that  trade  liberalization  helps import  a price system). He attri- 
butes  this  result  to excessive devaluations  of the domestic  currency. 
23. Bruno  (1992)  suggests  that  Poland  set too high  an exchange  rate  at the start  of its 
stabilization.  In Israel,  a slightly  overvalued  exchange  rate was used as part  of the anti- 
inflation  strategy. 
24. It was more  relevant  to countries  like Hungary  and  the Czech  and  Slovak  Federal 
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eralization  and privatization.  The case for using tariffs  is twofold:  first, 
they provide  protection  against  imports;  second, they provide  revenue 
for the budget. Both factors imply gradualism  in reducing  tariffs. To 
minimize  the inevitable  political  pressures  for special treatment,  tariffs 
should  be uniform;25  they could start  as high as 30 to 40 percent  and be 
reduced  over five years  to low levels. That  way, they would  provide  pro- 
tection for domestic  producers  while the economy is reorganizing;  gen- 
erate revenue for the budget  while a more sophisticated  tax system is 
being set up; and still allow a foreign  price system to be imported.  The 
fiscal case for trade taxes is already  accepted in Russia on the export 
side, where oil exports will be taxed. The case is also strong  on the im- 
port side. While tariffs carry potential political economy dangers, so 
does a lack of budget  revenue. Gradual  tariff  reductions  can be built  into 
programs  with the international  agencies. 
Enterprise Reform and Privatization 
Soviet industrial  enterprises  were very large  and  industry  was corres- 
pondingly  monopolized.26  See table  7 for a comparison  of industrial  con- 
centration  in the Soviet Union, the United States, and Poland.  In 1988, 
47,000 industrial  enterprises  operated  in the Soviet Union. In the first 
half of 1990, enterprises  owned by local authorities  and republics ac- 
counted  for 35 percent  of value added.27  The private  sector in the Soviet 
Union  was minuscule.  Nearly  90 percent  of employment  was in state en- 
terprises,  8 percent  was on collective farms,  and  less than  4 percent  was 
in private  activity  (including  cooperatives).  The number  of cooperatives 
surged  at the end of the Soviet period,  exceeding  250,000  (with  nearly  40 
percent in construction)  in the middle  of 1991, employing  more than 6 
million  people and accounting  for as much as 5 percent of GDP. How- 
25. There  is a theoretical  case for reducing  all tariffs  proportionately,  such that the 
ratio  of domestic-to-foreign  prices  approaches  unity  gradually.  I assume  that such tariffs 
are too liable  to manipulation  to be a useful  baseline. 
26. Joint  Study  (1991,  vol. 2, p. 40)  lists products  for which  industrial  concentration  by 
producer  is high.  They include  sewing  machines  (100  percent  of output  is produced  by a 
single  enterprise);  hydraulic  turbines  (100  percent),  steam  turbines  (95 percent)  (with  hy- 
draulic  and  steam  turbines  being  produced  by the same  company);  freezers  (100  percent); 
and  many  more. 
27. Data  are  from  Joint  Study  (1991,  vol. 2, pp. 15-40), which  provides  a succinct  de- 
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Table 7.  Size Distribution of Employment in Industrial Enterprises in the Soviet Union, 
the United States, and Poland 
Percentage  of all workers 
Nlumber  of employees 
1,000 
Countiy  and year  1-99  100-499  500-999  and over 
Soviet  Union (1988)a  1.8  13.2  11.7  73.3 
United States  (1985)  27.6  33.8  12.7  25.8 
Poland (1986)  10  25  15  51 
Source:  Data for the Soviet  Union are from Joint Study  (1991, vol.  2, p.  37). Data for the  United  States  (for the 
manufacturing sector)  are from Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States,  1988,  p.  499.  Data  for  Poland  (for  the 
socialized  sector,  only) are from Lipton and Sachs  (1990, p. 84). 
a.  In  1988, 15.6 percent of the Soviet  industrial workforce  was employed  in enterprises  with between  5,000 and 
10,000 workers,  and 21.5 percent was in enterprises  that employed  more than 10,000 workers. 
ever, 80 percent  of these cooperatives  were operating  within  existing  en- 
terprises28-a process that can be viewed either as the beginning  of in- 
dustrial  restructuring  through  the spinning  off of viable components  of 
firms  or simply  as the ripping  off of state assets. 
In the debate  over shock  treatment  versus  gradualism,  the pace of pri- 
vatization  and  the development  of the private  sector are relevant  issues 
that pit experts on China29  against  those involved in Eastern  European 
reform.  China's  gradualist  reforms, which started in agriculture,  have 
not involved formal  privatization  and state firms  have not been sold to 
private  individuals.  Nonetheless, a vibrant,  essentially private, sector 
has developed  in Chinese  agriculture  and  industry  and  the reforms  have 
been extremely  successful by any economic measure. 
In Eastern  Europe,  the stated  preference  has been for rapid  privatiza- 
tion. In practice, Eastern  European  progress  in privatization  has been 
disappointing,  especially in Poland, where sophisticated schemes for 
mass  privatization  have yet to be implemented.30  Success has been con- 
siderable  in small-scale  privatization-the privatization  of small (pri- 
marily  retail)  firms,  whose purchase  or lease is often  financed  by the gov- 
ernmental  agency making  the sale. Privatization  of medium-  and large- 
scale  firms  has  been  less successful, although  the Czechoslovak  voucher 
scheme could soon result  in privatizing  much  of industry-and perhaps 
28.  Johnson and Kroll (1991). 
29.  See, for example, Singh (1991) and McMillan and Naughton (1992). 
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shortly  thereafter  could also bring  widespread  disillusionment  with the 
promises  of financial  operators.  Hungary,  which has avoided  grandiose 
schemes and encourages  current  management  and workers to pursue 
the sale of their  firms  subject  to approval  by the State Property  Agency, 
appears  to be making  some progress  with privatization  of larger  firms.3' 
The circumstances  in Russia, where the state and  the state order  sys- 
tem have collapsed,  are different  from  those in China.  The Russian  gov- 
ernment  has been losing control over the enterprise  sector and must 
clarify  the ownership  status of firms  and the rules under  which they are 
to operate,  for the old rules  no longer  apply. In that  sense, gradualism  in 
the reform  of the enterprise  sector  in Russia  cannot  occur. The new rules 
and the new strategy  must be developed and implemented  so that firms 
can again  begin  to operate  with clear  management  objectives.32  The gov- 
ernment  also should aim to move firms  out of state control as soon as 
possible. 
However, enterprise  reform  needs to be gradualist  in recognizing  that 
privatization  of large  firms  will take time-perhaps up to a decade-un- 
til most of the largest firms have been mostly privatized. Gradualism 
also is needed  to implement  a strategy  in which  the state  will be responsi- 
ble for a significant,  but diminishing,  part  of industry  for years and not 
for months. 
Such a strategy  would  look much  like those being  carried  out in prac- 
tice (although  not in rhetoric)  in Eastern  Europe and the approach  that 
is starting  in Russia. The first  Russian  auctions  of small  firms  took place 
at the beginning  of April 1992, but local authorities  are not showing 
much  enthusiasm  about  the sales.33  Small-scale  privatization  is both ur- 
gent-as  a precedent  and signal  that  the privatization  effort  is serious- 
and  important,  because the distribution  sector in which such firms  oper- 
ate is vastly underdeveloped  in Russia.34  Growth  in this area is likely 
eventually  to come from new firms,  but opening  up the sector requires 
31.  Fischer(1991b). 
32.  In the New  Economic  Policy  (NEP)  in the  1920s, large firms, which  were kept 
under state ownership,  were  told to behave  like commercial  enterprises.  They  formed 
themselves  into large trusts and presumably  maximized  profits like good  monopolists 
should. 
33.  Shleifer and Vishny (1992). 
34.  Much of the success  of the NEP in the 1920s resulted from permitted private enter- 
prise into the distribution sector. Private firms' activities brought the sector that predomi- 
nated at the time-the  rural sector-actively  back into the economy.  See Fischer (1992). Stanley Fischer  97 
the privatization  of existing  firms  owned by local authorities.  As empha- 
sized by Andrei  Shleifer  and Robert  Vishny, existing stakeholders  will 
have to be given incentives  to obtain  their  support  for privatization.35  If 
rapid  progress  cannot be made in this easiest area of privatization,  the 
entire  privatization  and  reform  process will be severely set back. 
Stories about spontaneous or nomenklatura  privatization  of larger 
firms abound. Case study evidence presented by Simon Johnson and 
Heidi Kroll suggests that firms'  managers  have generally  strengthened 
their control and their residual  property  rights  during  the period since 
1988,  but  that  they have not obtained  dejure ownership  of firms.36  John- 
son and Kroll  emphasize  the part  played  by management  and  downplay 
the role of the nomenklatura.  Newspaper and other reports  of corrup- 
tion in the transfer  of property  tend  to emphasize  the role  of the bureauc- 
racy. It is not inconsistent  with Johnson  and Kroll's evidence to argue 
that in many cities and regions, property  rights are being (insecurely) 
passed from the state sector to others, to the benefit of the nomen- 
klatura. 
Both existing  management  and existing  workers  will have to support 
privatizations  of larger  firms  if firms  are to be moved quickly into the 
private sector. Thus privatization  schemes that give existing workers 
and  management  significant  shares  of the privatized  firm  are  more  likely 
to succeed than those that ignore the current  distribution  of implicit 
property  rights.37  Shleifer  and  Vishny suggest  that  the shares  be given in 
a way that directly encourages  management  and workers to privatize; 
for instance, shareowners could receive dividends only after priva- 
tization. 
The first  step in privatization  of larger  firms-and one that can come 
within months-should  be corporatization:  moving the firms out of 
bureaucratic  control  and into the control  of corporate  boards. Workers 
will have to be represented  on these boards.  Inevitably  the board's  com- 
position  will have to compromise  between the need for knowledgeable 
members  and the need to keep out the nomenklatura.  For the largest 
firms,  it would  be desirable  to bring  in Western  experts, but  they should 
speak  Russian. 
35.  Shleifer and Vishny (1992). 
36.  Johnson and Kroll (1991). 
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As in Hungary,  Russia  from  the beginning  should  be encouraging  pri- 
vatization  by existing  firms,  subject  to state approval.  This process can 
take  place  at any time  while other  privatization  schemes are  being  devel- 
oped and  implemented. 
A possible privatization strategy following corporatization  starts 
with  each board-for manageability,  say, boards  of firms  with  more  than 
2,500 employees-presenting  a restructuring  plan to the privatization 
agency. All firms  whose boards  present  a plausible  restructuring  scheme 
that  does not involve large  externalities  for a given region  or city will go 
into a privatization  pool. Ownership  rights  for the firms  in the privatiza- 
tion pool should  be distributed  to citizens, as well as workers  and man- 
agers, through  a voucher scheme-perhaps  one that gives individuals 
ownership  in holding  companies, rather  than individual  firms. Smaller 
firms could be privatized  through  vouchers in the same or a separate 
scheme. The Eastern  European  evidence is that such schemes can get 
stuck, which is all the more  reason  for urgency. 
It will be necessary during  the restructuring  process for the state to 
decide  how to deal  with  existing  financial  assets and  liabilities  in firm  bal- 
ance sheets. There is a real attraction  in a widespread  write-down  or 
even write-off  of debts and corresponding  assets, an action that would 
have to involve the banks. The banks could be compensated  by being 
given claims  on a diversified  portfolio  of firm  equity and by being given 
government  bonds as reserve assets. 
The large size of the enterprises  and the concentration  of industries 
creates both advantages  and problems  for boards considering  restruc- 
turing.  On the benefit  side, the large  firms  are too vertically  integrated; 
each provides its own complete range of ancillary services, such as 
catering, haircutting,  and manufacturing  spare parts in machine tool 
shops. Restructuring  can begin  by peeling  off viable  parts  of firms.  Simi- 
larly, because the firms  are in many  cases monopolies  that  hold most of 
the country's technical knowledge to produce that commodity, it is 
likely that some part  of the firms  will survive  in the new regime. 
The prime disadvantage  of largeness is that rapidly  closing down a 
giant  firm  that  dominates  the economy of a city or region  will not be po- 
litically  possible. Such giant  firms  will not go into the privatization  pool; 
for them  Russia  will have to develop regional  and  restructuring  policies. 
To state the point  clearly,  this arrangement  borders  on industrial  policy. 
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able to do what most other governments-most obviously the German 
government-cannot, which is to leave such restructurings  to the mar- 
ket, particularly  because  the market  for corporate  restructuring  does not 
yet exist.38  To put the point succinctly, privatization  is not an adequate 
restructuring  policy. Pretending  that restructuring  will take place if left 
to the market  only delays doing what has to be done. An agency, oper- 
ated with external  financial  and expert support,  should  be set up to deal 
with those firms  that do not go into the privatization  pool, to develop 
restructuring  plans  (and,  if necessary, phased  steps to shut  down firms). 
Within  a few years, the Russian  private  sector  will  grow  more  through 
the creation  of new firms  than through  privatization.  Thus an essential 
element of the enterprise  reform  strategy  consists of developing  the le- 
gal, financial, and educational systems and infrastructure  to support 
new enterprises. 
Eastern  European  governments  have been concerned  that  at the cur- 
rent  over-devalued  exchange  rates, foreigners  could buy up too much  of 
their  countries  at too low a price. A similar  concern  seems to have arisen 
in the FSU in the recently completed negotiations  over a Chevron  in- 
vestment in the Tengiz oil field, which revealed a Groucho  Marx-like 
fear on the former  Soviet side of accepting  any deal to which the other 
side agreed. Despite such concerns, foreign direct investment, which 
brings  not only finance  but also management  expertise and technology, 
should  be and  is being  welcomed  by the Russian  government.  Russia  has 
hired  foreign  advisers  to help develop and appraise  potential  foreign  in- 
vestments; this is an area in which international  agencies such as the 
World  Bank, which presumably  can operate more as honest brokers, 
might  play an active role. At present, the real problems  with foreign  in- 
vestment  are that there is too little rather  than too much of it, and that 
much  of that  is going  into deals that are often corrupt.  While  foreign  in- 
vestors are obviously extremely  interested  in Russia, foreign  direct in- 
vestment  will not flow on a substantial  scale, such as the scale on which 
it is now flowing  to Hungary  (where  it is more than 3 percent of GNP), 
until  some sense of stability  returns. 
Of course, foreign  expertise can be obtained  without  foreign  invest- 
ment. There is no reason why foreign management  should not be im- 
ported  on contract,  even if foreign  firms  do not want to invest directly. 
38.  On the active role of the Treuhandanstalt in managing the industrial transition in 
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THE  FINANCIAL  SECTOR.  The creation  of a viable  private  sector de- 
pends  on the availability  of financing  both  to purchase  existing  firms  and 
to create new firms. To some extent, financing  for privatization  can 
come from the state sector-for  example, in small-scale  privatization, 
by leasing rather than immediately  selling firms-and  by setting the 
prices  of firms  low enough,  through  voucher  schemes. The development 
of new firms  depends more on the development  of the banking  system, 
through  restructuring  of existing  balance  sheets and  the creation  of new 
banks or units within existing banks. The possibility of canceling ex- 
isting debts between firms and banks and replacing them with bank 
claims  on a diversified  range  of firms  has already  been noted. Implicit  or 
explicit  state guarantees  would  be needed  to ensure  that  banks  do not go 
under  if firms  fail on a large  scale. 
Financial  sector reforms  have lagged in Eastern Europe, except in 
Hungary.  Many new and specialized  banks  have been set up in Russia, 
but the existing  banks  have not yet been reformed. 
THE  AGRICULTURAL  SECTOR.  Attention  in privatization  focuses on 
industrial  enterprises.  However, improving  the agricultural  sector  is one 
of the highest reform  priorities.  Improvements  in the availability  and 
quality of food would not only benefit the population, but also bring 
strong  political support  to the reform  process. Thus the priority  being 
put on agricultural  reform  by outside agencies providing  technical as- 
sistance is well-directed.39  It appears  that many  farmers  on collectives 
do not want privatization;  however, there must be many farmers  who 
do. The development  of private  ownership  of land and the extension of 
private agriculture  are areas in which rapid progress is possible and 
would have a high  payoff.40 
There is one other area  where privatization  could have a high  payoff 
but has generally  been implemented  slowly in other  countries:  housing. 
New Currencies, Inter-republican  Trade, 
and Economic Coordination 
The dissolution  of the Soviet Union will lead to a decline-at  least in 
the near term-of  inter-republican  trade and the introduction  of inde- 
39.  The World Bank is coordinating a major study of reform of the agricultural sector. 
40.  For a preliminary view  of reform priorities in agriculture, see Joint Study (1991, 
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pendent  currencies  in some republics  of the FSU. At present,  the fifteen 
republics  of the FSU continue to use one currency  and have agreed  in 
principle  to allow  the free passage  of goods among  them. But the Baltics 
and  Ukraine  have already  announced  that  they intend  to introduce  their 
own currencies  and other republics  are preparing  to do so. Ukraine's 
coupons are close to being a new currency. Moreover, goods are not 
flowing  freely among  republics. 
Would  the republics  be better off staying in the ruble zone or intro- 
ducing  their  own currencies?  If Russia  continues  to move ahead  on price 
liberalization,  stabilization,  and convertibility,  there would be advan- 
tages for the other republics  to staying  in the ruble zone and automati- 
cally acquiring  a more stable and convertible  currency.  In addition,  in- 
ter-republican  trade would probably  hold up better if the ruble zone 
were maintained.41  Offsetting these advantages is the certainty that 
there will have to be major  changes in relative  wages among  republics; 
these would be easier to attain if exchange rates among the republics' 
currencies  could  be adjusted.  Republics  with  less developed  tax systems 
may want  to use seigniorage  more  than  others;  this too requires  an inde- 
pendent  currency.  Of course, operating  an independent  currency  would 
require  improving  the quality  of central  bank  management. 
By virtue  of its size and  relative  wealth,  Russia  would  be less affected 
by the breakdown  of inter-republican  trade  and the ruble  area than the 
other  republics.  At the first  stage of its reform  program,  Russia  was able 
to force price liberalization  on the others because they were not pre- 
pared  to introduce  their own currencies  and manage  their own econo- 
mies. Russia's progress  in achieving macroeconomic  stabilization  has 
put pressure  on other  republics  by reducing  the availability  of rubles  to 
cover their budget deficits and meet payrolls. Russia hopes to tighten 
fiscal  and  monetary  policies and  move toward  convertibility  within  a few 
months.  The other  republics  will either  have to stabilize  at the same  time 
or introduce  independent  currencies. Beyond this defensive motive, 
some republics  view an independent  currency  as a necessary attribute 
of sovereignty. 
In any case, Ukraine  and perhaps  the Baltics are planning  to intro- 
duce their own currencies  later this year; other western republics  are 
41.  This argument is not analytically clear-cut. If a country had an independent  cur- 
rency and was trying to maintain free trade, it would have one more instrument with which 
to attain its free trade goal-exchange  rate changes. However,  more often, countries intro- 
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likely  to follow. Presumably  these republics  would  want  their  currencies 
to be convertible  as soon as possible, but because reforms  have been 
slow, convertibility  will be delayed. The Central  Asian republics  will 
probably  want to stay in the ruble area as long as they continue to re- 
ceive transfers  from Russia. Those transfers  could be made explicitly 
through  budgetary  transfers  or trade credits or by pricing  Russian ex- 
ports at internal  Russian  prices (that  is, net of export taxes). For 1992, 
Russia  will not levy export taxes on oil sent to other republics.  Thus at 
least temporarily,  Russia is seeking  to maintain  the wider trading  zone. 
In the longer run, Russia's decision on whether to provide transfers 
must  be mainly  political. 
New currencies  can be introduced  cooperatively  by retiring  an equiv- 
alent volume of rubles  held within  the territory  or owned by citizens of 
the republic  and  replacing  them  with  the new currency.  A more  confron- 
tational  approach  would  be to ignore  the existing  stock of rubles,  leaving 
citizens to dispose of them  as best they can. There  is a mutual  interest  in 
avoiding  a confrontation  on this issue, so that new currencies  are likely 
to be introduced  cooperatively. 
Republics  other  than  Russia  lag in the reform  effort, not only because 
they are not yet committed  to moving  toward  a market  system, but also 
because they lack the qualified  personnel needed to manage  a reform 
program.  Even Ukraine,  which  is politically  committed  to genuine  inde- 
pendence  and  therefore  has to develop an independent  economic policy 
management  ability,  is only now beginning  to pull an economic team  to- 
gether-and Ukraine  has a large  population,  financial  resources, and  di- 
aspora  on which to draw.  Economic management  will be a real  problem 
for other republics, even  with the  assistance of  the  international 
agencies. 
Inter-republican  Trade 
The breakup  of the ruble  zone would  speed the decline  of inter-repub- 
lican trade, especially if currencies  are not convertible. It is often said 
that the republics  of the FSU were extremely closely integrated,  more 
than market  economies are likely to be. Table 2 includes some data on 
the extent of trade,  showing  Belarus's  exports  at 70 percent  of net mate- 
rial  product  (NMP). Because table  2 presents  data  for the largest  repub- 
lics, it understates  the importance  of trade  for the representative  repub- Stanley Fischer  103 
Table 8.  Inter-republican and Foreign Trade Balances of Selected Republics, 1987 
Percent of net material product 
At domestic  prices  At world  prices 
Republic  Inter-republican  Abr  oad  Total  Inter-republican  Abr-oad  Total 
Russia  0.9  -  8.3  -  7.4  7.4  3.3  10.7 
Ukraine  1.6  -  7.7  -  6.2  -  3.9  -  1.5  -  5.4 
Uzbekistan  -  20.6  -  0.5  -  21.1  -  23.6  0.5  -  23.1 
Khazakstan  -  20.0  -  7.8  -  27.8  -  24.4  -4.1  -  28.5 
Belarus  11.8  -7.6  4.2  -8.3  -0.8  -9.5 
Lithuania  -  4.5  -  7.9  -  12.3  -  37.0  -  2.2  -  39.2 
Soturce: Joint Study (1991, vol.  1, pp. 226-7). 
lic. The average 1988 export ratio (exports/NMP)  in inter-republican 
trade  for the other ten republics  was 57 percent. For the Soviet Union, 
the GDP/NMP  ratio was 1.34, so the average inter-republican  export/ 
GDP ratio  for the smaller  republics  would be 40 to 45 percent.42  This is 
about the same as the dependence  of the smaller  European  economies 
on intra-European  trade. But because of the extreme specialization  of 
production  in the FSU, the republics  must  be more  mutually  dependent 
for vital production  inputs  than  they will be after  economic reform. 
The massive changes  in relative  prices that  have to occur will disrupt 
production  all over the FSU. They also will impose huge adverse bal- 
ance of payments  shocks on many of the republics,  particularly  the en- 
ergy importers.  Table 8 presents estimates of the balance of payments 
shift caused by moving  to world  prices for the five largest  republics  and 
for Lithuania,  one of the worst hit former  republics.43  These impacts  are 
being cushioned by Russia's agreement to maintain  a relatively low 
price of oil (compared  to world prices) for inter-republican  trade for 
1992. Nonetheless, the data indicate the macroeconomic  adjustments 
that  must  be made  over the next few years. 
The republics  appear  to be moving  toward  a series of bilateral  trade 
deals for 1992. These agreements  would avert the worst outcome-a 
complete  collapse of trade along with the Soviet Union. However, the 
42.  Joint Study (1991, vol.  1, p. 225). I assume in making this calculation that the ser- 
vices that are responsible for the gap between NMP and GDP are not traded. 
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danger  remains  of a sharp  reduction  of the volume of trade  as bilateral 
balancing-requiring the double coincidence of wants-replaces  the 
multilateral  trade  that  took place in the FSU. In a simple  calculation,  us- 
ing  a matrix  of inter-republican  trade,  I assumed  that  with  bilateral  clear- 
ing, trade  between each pair  of countries  would settle at the lower level 
of imports  or exports in 1988.  The volume of trade  would decline to 44 
percent of its previous value under this constraint,  a huge shock with 
potentially  dangerously  disruptive  effects on trade. 
There is no question that trade patterns within the FSU have to 
change drastically  over the next few years. It is thus tempting  to argue 
that  whatever  decline  in trade  takes place is part  of a process of creative 
destruction  that will lead more rapidly  to an efficient  pattern  of output. 
This  is wrong  in two respects. As a matter  of theory, trade  that  must  ulti- 
mately disappear  may nonetheless be desirable  in a second-best situa- 
tion. As a matter  of political  economy, a very rapid  decline in produc- 
tion-even  production that must ultimately disappear-may  stop a 
reform  program  in its tracks. The recent experience of Eastern  Europe 
provides suggestive evidence that trade-related  shocks can produce a 
too rapid  decline in output. 
The Inter-republican Payments  Mechanism 
What  can the republics  do to mitigate  and  smooth  these shocks?  They 
have much  to gain  by collaborating  on questions  of trade  and  macroeco- 
nomic reform-on  matters  of inter-republican  payments  and, if neces- 
sary, in the introduction  of new currencies. At present, the republics 
lack a framework  of collaboration.  The case for the introduction  of a 
mechanism  like the European  Payments  Union (EPU) has been made 
by Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Daniel Gros, among  others.44  The case for a 
payments  mechanism  includes:  the need for a collaborative  framework; 
the potential  gains from multilateral,  rather  than bilateral,  clearing  of 
trade;  and the fear that without such a mechanism,  trade could spiral 
downward  as each republic  imposes restrictions  on other  republics  that 
they fear cannot pay. The case against introducing  a new mechanism 
views a payments  union  as a mechanism  that  will maintain  central  plan- 
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ning  of trade  and impose quantitative  restrictions,  rather  than  promote 
rapid  convertibility-a  charge given some plausibility  by the fact that 
current  account convertibility  was attained  in Western  Europe only in 
1958. 
Much of the controversy over a payments union and the apparent 
Russian  opposition  to it stem from  the emphasis  on the EPU precedent. 
The EPU board  did play a major  role in managing  trade  and payments 
among  its members,  in many  respects  taking  the place  of the IMF.4s  That 
is not needed in the FSU, where the IMF and the World  Bank already 
are  active, nor  is the necessary  experience  available  in the FSU. Rather, 
the need is for a more modest organization,  the Inter-republican  Pay- 
ments Mechanism  (IRPM).  This group  would have three  tasks: to oper- 
ate as a technical  organization  to clear payments;  to provide a mecha- 
nism to extend credit among  republics, and to economize on reserves; 
and to provide  a convenient  focus for broader  inter-republican  cooper- 
ation. 
The issue is usually  posed as convertibility  versus a payments  union. 
But components  of an IRPM  would be needed even with convertibility. 
The banking  systems in the republics  of the FSU are underdeveloped 
and  explicit arrangements  for inter-republican  payments  will need to be 
worked  out, with the help of outside agencies. The arrangements  would 
involve relations  among the central banks of the republics, as well as 
among  the nascent private  banking  systems. This is the first necessary 
function  of an IRPM. Second, credit could be extended among  the re- 
publics  to try to prevent  credit  constraints  from, in effect, imposing  bi- 
lateral  balancing  on trade. The central  banks of the republics  will have 
to agree  on mutual  credit  limits, to be administered  through  the IRPM. 
As in the case of the EPU, increasingly  onerous settlement  provisions 
will have to be imposed as imbalances increase, and upper bounds 
should be set on imbalances.  Convertibility  is not a full substitute  for 
such arrangements  because the republics  will be short of reserves. An 
IRPM  can be viewed as a means of economizing  on hard-currency  re- 
serves, setting up an alternative  means of financing  temporary  imbal- 
ances among  the republics,  even after  convertibility  is attained. 
The IRPM  should  be thought  of as a source of transactions  balances 
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to finance  current  transactions,  not as a source of long-term  financing. 
Given the adjustments  some republics  must  make, they will run  current 
account deficits  for some years. Financing  plans for those deficits will 
involve agreement  with the IMF and  may include  separate  intergovern- 
mental agreements  among republics for the extension of longer-term 
credit. Those agreements  could be negotiated at IRPM meetings, but 
they are not an inherent  part  of an IRPM. 
Some framework  for continuing  inter-republican  collaboration  and 
economic relations  is clearly  needed. The republics  need to collaborate 
not only in developing  payments  mechanisms  and  providing  the associ- 
ated credits, but also to prevent potentially  destructive  trade and cur- 
rency reforms.  To this point, they have been collaborating  on an ad hoc 
basis, including  negotiating  bilateral  trade  agreements.  A more perma- 
nent  multilateral  arrangement,  in the context of the IRPM,  possibly  with 
external  technical assistance, would be constructive. It is not inherent 
in the creation  of an IRPM  that it would slow progress  to a market  sys- 
tem; the inclusion of international  agencies would help ensure that it 
moves in the right  direction. 
There is one other potential  role for an IRPM. It could be seen as a 
mechanism  through  which external  assistance could be funneled  to the 
republics and conditionality for such assistance could be imposed. 
There might  be a case for using IRPM  in this way if the republics  were 
not members  of the IMF and the World  Bank. Because they are mem- 
bers, bilateral  assistance can be provided  through  cofinancing  of IMF 
and Bank programs,  with conditionality  agreed  upon in direct negotia- 
tions among  the agencies and the republics.  The need for donor  coordi- 
nation  remains.46 
In the area  of inter-republican  coordination  and payments, as in pri- 
vatization,  the best is the enemy of the good, and the transition  has to 
be managed.  The "best" in this case would be full convertibility,  with 
adequate  reserves, for all currencies  in the FSU. The current  structure 
of inter-republican  trade  must  be destroyed.  But convertibility  with ade- 
quate  reserves  will not happen  anytime  soon, and  trade  can  be destroyed 
too rapidly  if nothing  is developing  in its place. These difficulties  make 
the case for an IRPM  that  goes beyond  the necessary  minimum  of a tech- 
nical  organization  to manage  the payments  mechanism. 
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External Assistance for Russia 
Maintaining  the pace and direction  of political  and  economic reforms 
in the FSU is certainly  in the interests  of the West. The West has recog- 
nized  this interest  by engaging  the FSU through  diplomacy,  through  de- 
fense arrangements,  and with financial  assistance and membership  in 
the international  organizations.  In April 1992,  the G-7 announced  a $24 
billion  aid package  for Russia, for 1992.  Because aid remains  controver- 
sial and  the full details  of the aid package  are not yet clear, I will discuss 
the general case for financial  assistance for Russia and the other re- 
publics. 
For economic and political stability, the reforming  republics need 
four types of assistance:  humanitarian,  technical, and general  financial 
aid, as well as access to Western  markets.  Humanitarian  and  food aid is 
reaching  the FSU. So is technical  assistance, particularly  as the interna- 
tional  agencies, including  the European  Community,  have moved deci- 
sively into the area. The technical assistance is so far concentrated  on 
Russia, but is beginning  to spread to the other republics, where it is 
needed  even more. However, technical  assistance  from  official  agencies 
is usually provided  in the visiting fireman  form: in assisting the newly 
forming  governments,  it is important  to station people in the republics 
for periods of a year or more, if possible. While  technical assistance is 
now flowing,  the FSU can easily and  productively  absorb  more. 
It is almost impossible to get accurate  data on aggregate  assistance 
that  so far  has been provided  to the Soviet Union and  the other  republics 
of the FSU. Table  9 presents  one set of data  on total financial  assistance 
commitments  to the Soviet Union and the republics in the period be- 
tween September 1990 and December 1991. The total committed in 
those 16  months-more than  $67  billion-is  impressive;  so are the facts 
that  more  than  half  that  amount  was committed  by Germany,  and so lit- 
tle was provided  by the United States and  Japan. 
Unfortunately,  table 9 is severely misleading.  Least important,  it is 
slightly misleading  in categorizing  food aid. Agricultural  credits, the 
form  of U.S. aid, are classified  as export credits. The category of food 
aid  in table  9 is probably  aid provided  by the donors  in the form  of food, 
rather  than,  say, credits.  The more  serious  difficulty  is that  the table  pre- 
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Table 9.  Aid Committed to the Former Soviet Union, by Donor, 
September 1990-December  1991 
Billions  of U.S.  dollarsa 
Food  and  Troop 
medical  Technical  Exports and  withdrawal  Total 
Region  or countly  assistance  assistance  other credits  aid  assistanceb 
Europe  1.3  1.6  32.4  10.4  50.5 
Germany  0.7  0.2  20.4  10.4  34.7 
Italy  ...  ...  4.0  ...  5.8 
United States  ...  ...  4.1  ...  4.1 
Japan  ...  0.2  2.5  ...  2.7 
South  Korea  ...  ...  3.1  ...  3.1 
Totalb  1.4  1.8  45.1  10.4  67.6 
Source: Initerniatiotnal  EconZomzic  Inisights, January-February  1992, p. 48. Figures based on unofficial data compiled 
by the European Community. 
a.  Data in source  were in European currency units (ecu).  An exchange  rate of $1.25/ecu  was ulsed. 
b.  Rows  and columns do not sum to totals because  of omitted entries. 
form of ceilings on export  credit  agency exposure, some of which were 
withdrawn  following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and some of 
which may represent  debt outstanding  rather  than potential  flows. The 
data  do not represent  aid disbursements.  The republics  could not access 
these amounts  of finance  within  a year  or even within  several  years. The 
more  useful aggregate  measure  of Western  assistance  in 1991  appears  in 
table  4-$12  billion  in net credits.  Russia's share  of this sum  is estimated 
at $6.5 billion.  Even in this lower  figure,  the official  credits  were to a con- 
siderable  extent replacing  disappearing  bank  credits. 
The package of financial  assistance for Russia announced  in April 
1992  has two components.  The first  is a currency  stabilization  fund  of $6 
billion. The second is balance of payments support  of $18 billion, in- 
cluding  $2.5  billion  of debt  rescheduling.  The currency  stabilization  fund 
is to come entirely from the IMF's General  Arrangements  to Borrow; 
about $4.5 billion of the remaining  financing  is expected to come from 
the international  agencies; and $11 billion  represents  bilateral  financial 
assistance, largely export credits, some of it already committed. The 
currency  stabilization  fund is intended  to support  the convertibility  of 
the ruble,  presumably  at a fixed  exchange  rate.  This step should  be taken 
only when and  if the Russian  government  tightens  the budget  and  mone- 
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The balance of payments support must have been calculated on a 
needs basis, reflecting  the amount  of import  financing  Russia  will need if 
some modest  level of recovery  in output-or at least only a small  further 
decline-is  to take place this year. In fact, the continuing  disruption  of 
inter-republican  trade makes further  deep declines in output this year 
very likely. This means (to answer  a question  raised  at the beginning  of 
the paper) that Russia and the other republics are likely to suffer far 
worse recessions than  Eastern  Europe  is now experiencing. 
Opposition  to the provision  of financial  assistance to Russia  is based 
on several arguments.  First, the type of advice and conditionality  that 
accompanies  IMF  and  World  Bank  assistance  is generally  wrong;  for in- 
stance, it urges gradualism  when shock treatment  is needed.47  Second, 
the money will be wasted because corruption  is rife. After all, critics 
ask, what has happened to the $67 billion of assistance already pro- 
vided?  Third,  the money would be better  spent elsewhere, for instance, 
in Africa. Fourth, easing of the financial  constraint  on the Russian (or 
any)  government  allows it to put off doing  the right  thing.  In the Russian 
context, that  would  be to generate  as much  foreign  exchange  as possible 
by selling  oil leases and  other  assets that  the West wants. Fifth, we can- 
not afford  it. 
Some of these arguments  are valid and should  find  their  reflection  in 
IMF and Bank conditionality-for instance in developing  oil leases, in 
requiring  budgetary  and  credit  tightening,  and  in other  reform  measures 
that are part of Russian agreements  with the agencies. The argument 
about Africa is unfortunately  wrong; the money would not be spent 
there either. Careful  monitoring  of IMF, World Bank, and other pro- 
grams  should  prevent  these particular  funds  from  being misused;  none- 
theless the aid donors should be pushing  hard  on the corruption  issue. 
However, there  should  be no illusion  that  the West provided  $67  billion 
of assistance  to the FSU last year. Rather,  as noted  above, the total was 
closer to $12 billion and some of that was used to repay debts to the 
West. The arguments  about whether  we can afford  such assistance are 
too familiar  to stand  repetition. 
The argument  that  governments  perform  best when left on their  own 
is wrong.  The correct  argument  is that  programs  forced on countries  by 
the international  financial  institutions  tend not to work. Programs  that 
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are chosen by governments,  to which the government  is fully commit- 
ted, do tend to work  well with external  assistance. Despite claims  to the 
contrary,  the countries  that reformed  successfully during  the 1980s  re- 
formed  with external  support.  The programs  were their  own, but the re- 
formers  were not left to their  own devices. 
The issue in Russia is momentous. Russia will not always be weak 
and this is the time when the basis of a new relationship  is being set. If 
the promised  assistance materializes  and works, Russia will need sub- 
stantial  aid for only a few years because Russia's balance of payments 
is fundamentally  strong. 
Of course, the aid must be conditional  on economic policies. That  is 
why the IMF and World  Bank  are involved. That  is also why even bilat- 
eral assistance should  be conditioned  upon an agreed-upon  reform  pro- 
gram  (most simply through  co-financing  of Fund and Bank programs). 
Similarly,  the other  republics  should  receive aid only when they pursue 
reformist  policies. So far, they have been reforming  very slowly. 
The Need for a Long-Term Strategy 
The drama  of economic reform  comes at the beginning,  with political 
change, new governments, IMF agreements, convertibility, debates 
about the role and inadequacy  of aid, and the rest of the scene that is 
increasingly  familiar  from Eastern Europe and the FSU. This initial 
phase  is crucial,  exciting,  and  interesting.  The issues are  clear-cut  and- 
thanks in large part to the policymakers  and advisers involved in the 
early stabilizations-the necessary policies are reasonably  well under- 
stood. 
Another crucial part comes later, when growth is not yet visible, 
when the industrial  structure  has not changed,  and  when early  promises 
have not been fulfilled.  This is what has happened  in Poland,  two years 
after the start of the reform. In Russia, the government  has not over- 
promised,  but its reform  program  also will face severe political  difficult- 
ies in a few years if structural  policies are not addressed  as intensively 
now as stabilization  and  financial  assistance. 
The Shatalin  Plan  was right  to set out a complete, phased  restructur- 
ing  plan, although  wrong  in its timing.  What  long-term  restructuring  pol- 
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years? The most important  is  the reform of the enterprise sector, 
through  privatization,  the development  of the distribution  sector, and 
industrial  restructuring,  as discussed above. Other  sectors that deserve 
special attention  in Russia  are the energy  sector (a potent source of for- 
eign  exchange),  the agricultural  sector, and  the financial  sector. The for- 
eign private sector has a potentially  important  role to play in all these 
sectors. 
Government  action would be useful in one other  area. Infrastructure 
is crumbling  in Russia, as it is in the rest of Eastern  Europe. Infrastruc- 
ture investment complements private investment and private invest- 
ment will take some time to develop. Now is the time for governments 
to begin  upgrading  infrastructure,  if necessary, with  external  assistance, 
for instance  from  the World  Bank. Such  investments  do not always  need 
public  funding.  Telecommunications  investment  is taking  place in East- 
ern Europe with private external  financing.  Transportation  infrastruc- 
ture  can also be developed  with the assistance  of private  capital.  With  a 
little imagination,  so can other parts of infrastructure.  As government 
gets out of areas in which it does not belong, it should move into areas 
where it does belong. Upgrading  infrastructure  early in the program 
makes  eminent  sense as part  of a growth-oriented  reform  strategy. Comments 
and Discussion 
Lawrence  Summers: Stanley Fischer's thorough  paper  does an excel- 
lent  job of articulating  what might  be labeled  the "economists'  consen- 
sus" view of the situation  in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Despite 
economists'  reputation  for never  being  able  to agree  on anything,  a strik- 
ing  degree  of unanimity  exists in the advice  that  has been provided  to the 
nations  of Eastern  Europe  and  the FSU. The legions of economists who 
have descended on the formerly  communist  economies have provided 
advice very similar  to, if less nuanced  than, the advice provided  in this 
paper. 
The consensus view of the transition  problem  articulated  by Fischer 
consists of five propositions: 
1. The situation  in formerly  communist  economies is unlike  anything 
that  the world  has ever encountered  before. 
2. Simply  addressing  stabilization  is insufficient  to solve this problem 
because it is profoundly  structural  in nature. 
3. The multitude  of problems  faced by formerly  communist  econo- 
mies are all connected. Examples abound of newly privatized  enter- 
prises  subtracting  value  by buying  oil at a nickel  a gallon,  or of privatiza- 
tion attempts  foundering  because of the difficulty  of valuing  enterprises 
when oil is selling  for a nickel a barrel. 
4. The three "ations"  privatization,  stabilization, and liberaliza- 
tion-all  must be completed as soon as possible. Maintaining  the mo- 
mentum  of reform is a crucial political problem. An adequate set of 
transfer  programs  to support  the unemployed  is essential, as is a safety 
net for other  losers in the reform  process. 
5. Western support  cannot hurt the prospects for reform  and has a 
prospect  of helping,  both politically  and economically. Given the enor- 
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mous worldwide  stake in the countries  of the FSU making  a successful 
transition  to a democratic  market  system, more  assistance  is better  than 
less. 
I suspect  that  these statements  would  find  agreement  with  most econ- 
omists who have thought  about  the FSU. And the propositions  are con- 
sistent  with  the position  that  the IMF  and  World  Bank  are  taking  as they 
negotiate  with the nations of Eastern Europe and the FSU. So I have 
little to quarrel  with in Fischer's paper. I merely  want to comment  in a 
little more detail on several of the issues that he takes up. Many of my 
comments  are amplifications,  rather  than  qualifications  or criticisms,  of 
Fischer's analysis. 
First, there is a real issue as to whether  reform  in the FSU is being 
adequately  financed.  According  to the Fischer paper  (similar  estimates 
are available  elsewhere), imports  into Russia  in 1990  were $82.9  billion; 
in 1991,  they were only $45.6 billion. While the exact use to which the 
vaunted  $24  billion  aid package  would be put is not clear, it is clear that 
it will not be nearly  large  enough  to offset the dramatic  import  compres- 
sion that the Russians  are now suffering.  It is unlikely  that imports  will 
rise to even two-thirds  of their  historic  level in the next few years, even 
if the entire  scheduled  aid  package  were disbursed.  The situation  is con- 
siderably  bleaker  in the fourteen  non-Russian  republics. 
It is instructive  to compare  the situations  of the FSU and  Eastern  Eu- 
rope. The nations  of the FSU surely  face far  greater  problems.  They are 
further  from  the West geographically,  systemically,  and  in terms  of past 
contacts. The FSU economy is far  more  distorted  in both a financial  and 
real sense than were any of the communist  economies of Eastern Eu- 
rope, and  it is facing  the challenges  of dissolution.  Yet import  compres- 
sion in the FSU-even  without  taking  account of the breakdown  of in- 
ternal trade-is  likely  to  be  several times  as  serious as  import 
compression  in Poland  and  other  parts  of Eastern  Europe. 
Second, at what level should  the exchange  rate be pegged?  Thinking 
only of Russia, Fischer suggests that the exchange rate be pegged in 
such a way that when average wages are converted into dollars, they 
come out to about $100  a month. At current  exchange rates, wages are 
in the $10  to $20  range,  so Fischer's  figure  implies  a very substantial  real 
appreciation.  I suspect it is unrealistic  to expect or to try and  contrive  a 
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For  all the reasons  I mentioned  as to why Russia  is in more  dire  straits 
than  Poland,  I believe that  there  is a case for setting  the wage at a lower 
dollar  level in Russia  than  in Poland  (where  the monthly  figure  was close 
to $75 following  stabilization).  Considerations  beyond the low produc- 
tivity of Russian  enterprise  point in this direction,  including  protection 
of enterprises  that need protection, and the fiscal consequences of oil 
export  taxes, which are more  favorable  at a lower, rather  than  a higher, 
exchange rate (a consideration  that is not present in Poland). On bal- 
ance, I suspect  that  $50  a month  is a more  plausible  short-run  target  than 
$100  a month.  Of course, any kind  of fixed exchange  rate is not a viable 
option  until  some  control  over  macroeconomic fundamentals is 
achieved. 
Third,  the energy sector should  be a crucial  locus of reform.  The po- 
tential  gains in export revenues from increasing  the efficiency  of petro- 
leum production  and increasing  efficiency in energy use probably  ex- 
ceed $100 billion by the end of the 1990s. Right now, energy intensity 
per unit of GNP is more than  five times the corresponding  figure  in Eu- 
rope, and  easy repairs  could  raise  drilling  and  shipping  productivity  sub- 
stantially.  Investments  in the energy sector are probably  the most lev- 
ered investments that the West can make to raise the flow of hard 
currency  to the FSU. 
Russia  and  several  other  republics  have potentially  valuable  oil prop- 
erties. I am reminded  of the statistic  that in 1983,  the value of Mexico's 
oil reserves was 20 times the value of Mexico's outstanding  debt, yet 
Mexico had a debt crisis. I wonder  whether  some part  of financial  engi- 
neering  with respect to the FSU could involve arranging  for the transfer 
of hard currency to Russia and other republics with petroleum re- 
sources, in return  for claims  on their  oil reserves-perhaps claims  guar- 
anteed  in some way by the Western  governments  that  are  seeking  to help 
the FSU. 
Fourth,  I think  Fischer  devotes too little  attention  to the issue of what 
to do about  the Gordian  knot  of the financial  sector. The banks'  principal 
assets are loans to the state sector. Because most of the enterprises  are 
under  water, the banks  are, as well. It is pointless to fix up the banks  if 
the enterprises  are still in trouble.  And without  viable  banks,  enterprise 
restructuring  and liquidation  is difficult  to arrange.  It is tempting  to say 
that  the right  answer  is to leave existing  institutions  aside and  set up new 
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now. The problem  is that the current  arrangement  is mostly Ponzi fi- 
nance,  with  less lending  to new enterprises  than  to bankers'  brothers-in- 
law. Supervision  surely must be improved.  But given the magnitude  of 
the supervision  failures  in the countries  of the OECD, it would be unre- 
alistic  to rely on supervision  as the complete  solution  to financial  sector 
problems. 
Fifth, it seems to me that Fischer is entirely correct in emphasizing 
the problems  with the Polish model of non-enterprise  reform,  which is 
to pound  your fist on the table and insist upon privatization  or nothing. 
But listening  to Fischer's description  of what should  be done leaves one 
understanding  why that advice is given in Poland. The prospect is not 
encouraging  for the Russian  government  organizing  to have a board  that 
would  assess the proposed  restructuring  plans  enterprise-by-enterprise, 
perhaps  in conjunction  with the banks  to which the enterprise  is in debt. 
The confusion engendered  by efforts to handle Canary Wharf  in the 
West points  up the difficulty. 
In addition  to underscoring  the importance  of privatization,  I would 
emphasize the need for mass corporatization.  This is highly desirable 
because  of the importance  of giving  incumbent  workers  and  managers  in 
current  firms  a claim  that  will ultimately  be sold. This provides  an incen- 
tive to maximize  enterprise  value, even in advance  of privatization. 
Sixth, Fischer  makes  light  of a very important  part  of the Russian  bal- 
ance of payments projection-the  projection  of substantial  balance of 
payments  improvement  from raising  prices on sales to other republics. 
Two separate  problems  arise here. There is a real problem  of the large 
subsidies that Russia has been giving to the other republics  by selling 
commodities,  principally  oil, at very low prices. This is not a problem 
that any amount  of payments  mechanism  could circumvent,  but a real 
structural  difficulty;  by accepting  it in making  arrangements  with Rus- 
sia, one raises the aid requirement  or, alternatively,  reduces the pros- 
pects for the remaining  republics. 
Seventh, there is the question  of whether  a payments  union or some 
similar  institution  should  be set up when and if republics  introduce  their 
own currencies.  Here I think  it is important  to distinguish  between the 
payments  mechanism  and the extension of credit. I believe that there  is 
a clear  case for multilateral  clearing  that  will conserve  on what  will inevi- 
tably  be scarce  hard  currency  reserves. There  is a much  weaker  case for 
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the West to some kind  of inter-republican  payments  mechanism.  There 
is Fischer's  point  that  the IMF is probably  better  at performing  some of 
the tasks that  the European  payments  mechanism  did than  any Russian 
bureaucracy  likely would be any time soon. And there is the additional 
point  that  the republics  with the least responsible  macroeconomic  poli- 
cies will have the largest trade deficits and will, therefore, have the 
greatest  access to finance.  So for the West to finance  its support  for the 
republics  through  such a mechanism  would be to give up important  op- 
portunities  to apply  conditionality  based on the pursuit  of specific  poli- 
cies at the republic  level. 
Eighth,  I wonder  whether  Fischer does not somewhat  overstate the 
case for infrastructure  investments.  It is hard  to deny that  infrastructure 
investment  is good; likewise, it is hard  to say that having  a good infra- 
structure  is not important,  and  there  is much  that  is wrong  with  the infra- 
structure  in the FSU. But I doubt  that it is too bad, relative  to the infra- 
structure  in other equally poor countries. The available aid flows are 
trivial  relative  to the cost of modernizing  the infrastructure  of the FSU. 
It may  well be that  support  for consumption  to maintain  the political  mo- 
mentum  for reform  is actually  a higher  priority  than support  for new in- 
frastructure  investment. 
William  Nordhaus: In reading  Stanley Fischer's analysis of the issues 
of economic reform  in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU), I 
found  myself admiring  the work of a master  chef. Fischer has analyzed 
all the necessary  data  ingredients  for economic reform,  combined  them 
using the classical macroeconomic  recipes, and produced  a three-star 
set of recommendations  for the sous-chefs who are in charge of the 
kitchens  in Moscow, Kiev, and Washington. 
Yet there  is something  vaguely  disturbing  about  the underlying  prem- 
ises of the Fischer paper. The issue arises in the very first paragraph, 
where  Fischer  writes: 
Less than  four months  after  the Soviet Union was dissolved, Russia had deci- 
sively liberalized  most prices and  was on the road  to macroeconomic  stabiliza- 
tion and  convertibility  of the ruble. 
Fischer  is one of the great  chefs of our  age-the  Escoffier  of stabiliza- 
tion plans-but  I think  his conclusion  is surely  premature.  I cannot  help 
think  of another  Fisher-Irving-who  opined on the state of the U.S. 
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due to the dislocation of purchasing  power by reason of transfers of 
stock  holdings  will  be  temporary.  .  .  .  For  the  immediate  future,  at 
least, the outlook  is bright."  ' 
I think  the issue can be posed as the struggle  between the cookbook 
(or duck) view and the chess view of the world. What  is the difference 
between master  chefs and chess grandmasters?  Making  a great duck a 
l'orange  is basically  a routine  activity. It involves getting  a fine  duckling, 
a few navel oranges and other easily obtained ingredients, and pos- 
sessing the skill to make its rich, meaty duck-essence sauce. By rou- 
tinely and scrupulously  following the cookbook or the skills learned 
from  one's master,  one can succeed day in and  day out. 
By contrast, playing a great game of chess is the essence of a non- 
routine  activity. Although  each game starts  exactly the same way, and 
even a few standard  opening gambits exist, the game rapidly  evolves 
into a historically  unprecedented  configuration.  After  a few moves, each 
game  becomes unique.  This  means  that,  while  general  strategies  are  pos- 
sible, no routine or cookbook approach  to chess exists. Like chaotic 
systems, chess games become increasingly  divergent  from  one another 
as they evolve. 
The question  for the Fischer  paper  is whether  economic stabilization 
policies are more like the routine exercises of preparing  a duck a 
l'orange  or like the chaotic  experience  of playing  a chess game. A strong 
tendency to hold the duck view of the world exists in bureaucracies  or 
international  organizations,  such as the IMF or the World  Bank. These 
two international  financial institutions have perhaps 100 supplicants 
asking  for aid and must respond in a principled  and formulaic  fashion 
to requests.  This bureaucratic  imperative  is reinforced  by a deep-seated 
human  need to simplify  and  classify so as to try to bring  order  to the con- 
fused and chaotic  jumble of data. For economic stabilization  purposes, 
the IMF therefore brings the reigning orthodoxy to bear on a given 
crisis. 
From this, we have the canonical five-plan for stabilization that 
Fischer  describes,  and  this would apply  everywhere  from  Azerbaijan  to 
Zaire. Fischer states that the "output  price"  of a stabilization  plan  is 20 
percent. This leads him to wonder whether, since Russia's output  has 
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already  declined around  20 percent, Russia must pay another  20 per- 
cent. Today's stabilization  plans sound chillingly  like a modern  version 
of blood-letting:  no pain, no gain. 
The question  this raises is whether  the duck  a la Bank  view of stabili- 
zation policies is appropriate  for all stabilization  purposes  independent 
of economic, social, and  political  initial  conditions.  Or  is it possible that 
in a country  that had devoted 70 years to systematically  destroying  ev- 
ery shrub  and sprout  of private  market  activity, the strategy  might  need 
to be different?  Are the former-socialist  economies so different  that  try- 
ing  orthodox  methods  will simply  fail?  (Let me say that  I do not disagree 
with  Fischer's view of the world.  At the same  time, if an options  markets 
existed, I would place a lot of money in deep out-of-the-money  puts 
against  the duck a la Bank  view of the world.) 
With  these general  reservations,  let me highlight  some of the reasons 
why I think  that  the Russian  situation  is more  complicated  than  the duck 
'a  la Bank  view of the world  tends to suggest. 
To begin with, it is clear that the Russian  government  has followed 
the IMF  cookbook  faithfully.  Prices  have been liberalized  and  free entry 
into virtually  every area exists. This is the only major  country in the 
world that has no duties on imports.  It is always reassuring  to see that 
textbook propositions  in economics are borne out: there definitely  are 
goods on the shelves as a result  of the price decontrol. 
The prognosis  for most of the other  ingredients  of the duck 'a  la Bank 
would seem to be in much greater  trouble. The Russian economic re- 
formers  seem to hold to the Chicago  variant  of the duck school, which 
holds that private  economic activity will quickly spring  up when state 
regulations  are withdrawn.  Yet, plans  for privatizing  are moving  oh-so- 
slowly. The first  step to privatization  is usually  thought  to be "corporati- 
zation," which involves separating  state-owned enterprises from the 
government  in corporate  form with their own management  and boards 
of directors.  This step has been postponed  until September  1992.  At the 
same time, old habits  die hard:  the privatization  minister,  Anatolii  Chu- 
bais, has given orders to the regional privatization  agencies and has 
threatened  to dismiss their  heads if they "fail  to meet their  targets." 
External  convertibility  of the ruble seems a long way off, given the 
current  level of the exchange rate. As of April 1992,  the exchange rate 
was somewhere between 80 rubles and 140 rubles to the dollar, de- 
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Fischer recommends  that the Russians defend an exchange rate of 10 
rubles  to the dollar.  That  is going  to require  some pretty  heavy paper. 
At an exchange rate of 100  rubles per dollar, the first-quarter  wage 
rate was $10  per month.  At this rate, Russia  ties Ethiopia  as the world's 
second poorest  country.  The undervalued  exchange  rate  results in such 
absurdities  in the price system as gasoline selling at 4 cents a gallon, 
bread  selling  at 3 cents a loaf, and subways  costing 0.5 cent a ride, along 
with restaurant  meals that cost Russians several months' salary and a 
total Russian  GNP less than  Hong Kong's (at current  exchange  rates). 
Aside from these intriguing  details, the sobering  thought  is that the 
foreign-exchange  market  is so far from what would seem to anyone a 
sensible equilibrium.  This market  is relatively  well developed by Rus- 
sian standards,  has low transportation  costs, and involves a standard- 
ized and divisible commodity. If this market  is so far from a sensible 
equilibrium,  what can we expect for oil, steel, spare  parts,  and  housing? 
One reason why stabilization  is not a simple case of duck a la Bank 
is that economic reforms  in the FSU must at the same time manage  the 
monetary  and fiscal system, as well as the external indebtedness  of a 
crumbling  empire. Fischer discusses some of the issues involved in the 
potential  breakdown  of inter-republican  trade in an enlightening  way, 
but I will focus on what seems to be the key one-the  monetary  system. 
Even as a unitary  government  before August 1991,  the Soviet Union 
had no way of conducting  monetary  policy with respect to household 
spending, although  it could in principle  use credit controls for enter- 
prises. The breakup  of the Soviet Union has led to a proliferation  of 
monies  in the ruble  zone. 
Many  analyses  today overlook  the fact that  the internal  inconvertibil- 
ity of the ruble is increasing.  Today, there is nominally  one money in 
the FSU, the ruble;  however, de facto the number  of different  forms of 
money is nineteen  and counting.  The multiple  currencies  arise because 
the different  rubles are in fact incompletely convertible into one an- 
other.  There  is the one paper  ruble  ("cash  money"),  which  circulates  ev- 
erywhere  in the FSU. In addition,  there are ruble accounts ("noncash 
money")  of enterprises  in the banking  systems of each of the fifteen  re- 
publics. In the West, we call this electronic money, but in the FSU, it 
seems more apt to call these "abacus  rubles." These ruble accounts, 
however, do not appear  to be convertible  into abacus rubles  across re- 
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teenth  money  is the Ukrainian  coupon;  the eighteenth  is hard  currencies 
such as the dollar. Moreover,  there are frozen hard-currency  accounts 
since the Vneshekonombank  (the bank of foreign economic relations) 
ran  out of hard  currencies  in December. 
At present,  the Ukrainian  coupon  (which  looks like a low-grade  piece 
of engraved  currency)  seems to be trading  at par with the paper  ruble, 
but  in Russia  at least, the abacus  ruble  appears  to be selling  at a discount 
of about  40 percent  relative  to the paper  ruble. Belarus  is reported  to be 
introducing  a coupon;  Estonia  is reported  to have  contracted  with  Canada 
to print  an Estonian  crown;  and  other  republics  are  presumably  on either 
the  coupon  or  currency  track.  This  suggests  that  sixteen  paper  currencies 
will exist along with the sixteen to thirty  abacus currencies  in the near 
future, assuming  that none of the autonomous  republics, autonomous 
oblasts, autonomous  okrugs,  or cities introduce  its own ration  coupons. 
What  are  the options?  The  first,  which  seems to be the cookbook  IMF 
approach,  is to push the republics  to sit down, reason together,  and run 
a common  monetary  policy in a ruble  zone. This approach  in essence is 
recommending  that  fifteen  republics,  full of mutual  distrust  and lacking 
in central-banking  competence, accomplish  in a few months what Eu- 
rope has been unable  to do in several  years. This is theoretically  sensible 
but practically  impossible. 
The second approach  would be for the republics  to admit  the inevita- 
ble fact and begin to develop their own individual  monetary  and fiscal 
policies, along  with some form  of convertibility  or clearinghouse  mecha- 
nism  to facilitate  trade. 
In the current  situation,  I believe that  the second approach-of inde- 
pendent  republics  with independent  currencies  and monetary  and  fiscal 
policies-eventually  will emerge. The sooner this approach  is recog- 
nized, the sooner this region will emerge from monetary  chaos. How- 
ever, what  is obvious  from  an economic  point  of view runs  into deep po- 
litical  and  practical  objections.  Now that the evil empire  has turned  into 
the kinder  and  gentler  empire,  it makes  life simpler  for outsiders  to have 
the empire  stay together;  the tendency for Westerners  to keep sending 
superglue  to the FSU is what  we might  call the Gorbachev  fallacy. A sin- 
gle political entity provides one-stop shopping for diplomats, econo- 
mizes on IMF and World Bank stabilization  funds, and most impor- 
tantly, slows the proliferation  of nuclear  weapons. I'm told, in addition, 
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In the presence of the disintegrating  monetary  system, it is not sur- 
prising  that production  has fallen and that trade has fallen even more 
sharply.  One of the striking  findings  in Fischer's paper  is that  from 1990 
to 1991, trade with the former  ruble trading  zone collapsed. Fischer's 
table 4 shows that trade with the ruble bloc fell by about half in 1991, 
whereas trade with the convertible zone fell only slightly. This result 
suggests  that  the risks  of a similar  collapse  within  the FSU are  extremely 
serious  if the ruble  becomes internally  inconvertible. 
Russian  officials  estimate  that  output  has fallen  between 10  to 20 per- 
cent this year. There  is no sign of private  production  of goods (whereas 
the growth of retail trade in flea markets  is booming, but fantastically 
inefficient). 
The real  danger  would  appear  to be an exacerbation  of the problem  of 
bottleneck  production  declines. A telling example is the breakdown  of 
buses in Moscow. Apparently,  one-third  of the buses are not operating 
because  of a shortage  of spare  parts.  The buses are  Hungarian-built.  Af- 
ter  the Russians  insisted  on hard-currency  payments  for oil, the Hungar- 
ians insisted  on hard-currency  payments  for spare  parts. However, the 
Russians  ran  out of hard  currency  last winter, so there  is nothing  to pay 
the Hungarians  for spare  parts;  hence, no operational  buses. 
The worrisome thought is that the Hungarian  bus syndrome will 
spread  in the month  ahead, particularly  if the monetary  crisis becomes 
worse, the republican  currencies become increasingly inconvertible, 
and inter-republican  trade  breaks  down. In a recent survey of 62 Mos- 
cow firms,  88 percent  reported  that "the  lack of raw materials,  semi-fin- 
ished  goods, [and]  equipment"  were among  "the  most serious  obstacles 
for the growth  of production  at your enterprise  for the last half year." 
Only  2 percent  of firms  reported  that "insufficient  demand  for your pro- 
duction"  was the most serious  obstacle.2 
I know of no economic cookbook that tells us how to handle  mone- 
tary  management  in a crumbling  empire.  The disintegration  of the Aus- 
trian  empire  led to the replacement  of the Austro-Hungarian  monetary 
system  with  a number  of national  currencies.  This produced  substantial 
inflation  in most  and  hyperinflation  in some, even though  monetary  man- 
agement  was under  the supervision  of the Reparations  Committee  set 
2.  The Russian Economic  Barometer,  1992, Moscow  (January), pp.  11, 16. I am in- 
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up under  the Treaty  of Versailles.3  Fischer suggests setting  up an inter- 
republican  payments  system  under  the benevolent  directorship  of the in- 
ternational  agencies-an  excellent idea if it can be engineered. 
It is difficult  to predict  the future  evolution  of the FSU monetary  sys- 
tem, but my rubles  are on the scenario  that the proliferation  of monies 
will continue  until  effective national  (that  is, republican)  currencies  are 
established.  A happy  outcome  would  be the slow establishment  of stable 
currencies and external convertibility such as occurred after World 
War  II in Western  Europe.  But we are surely  a long way from  that. 
What  might  a nightmare  scenario  be? As things  get worse, we might 
see growing  trade  barriers  among  republics,  basically  because republics 
refuse  to sell their  goods for the abacus  rubles  of other  republics.  Mone- 
tary trade  would then gradually  turn  to hard  currencies, as in the case 
of the Hungarian  bus parts.  At going exchange  rates, dollarization  is an 
expensive operation. 
Given the scarcity of hard currency, inter-republican  trade might 
then  gradually  degenerate  into barter.  This process would  be hardest  for 
the small republics  like the Baltics, which are most nationalistic,  have 
few hard-currency  exports, and depend  heavily on imported  goods and 
services. However, the descent to barter  poses perils even for Russia 
because of the highly  specialized  structure  of the FSU economy and  be- 
cause the collapse of the economies of its trading  partners  will boomer- 
ang upon itself. (Even a healthy market  economy like Finland  has suf- 
fered a major downturn  because of the collapse of its southeastern 
trading  partners.) 
The nightmare  scenario is that the descent into barter  would gradu- 
ally lead to a breakdown  in vital production  links;  the difficulties  would 
move from  the nuisance  of spare  parts  for buses to indispensable  inputs 
for nuclear power plants, oil and gas production,  railroads  and other 
transportation  links, and  medical  supplies.  Such wide-scale  barter  is un- 
precedented  in the modern  world;  even the wildest hyperinflations  did 
not manage  to drive the affected economies back to widespread  barter. 
It is hard  to see how the tender sprouts  of democracy  and civil society 
could survive  a breakdown  of the productive  process such as would oc- 
cur in the descent to barter. 
What  should  the youthful  team  of Russian  economists  and  their  West- 
ern advisers  do? I have no basic disagreements  with Fischer's recipes. 
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I worry  that they have not been proven in the laboratory  of the former 
centrally  planned  economies, but they seem to be the best bet. 
The problem  is that they represent  only the first moves in the chess 
game.  They  do not address  the next moves in the game:  how to reinvigo- 
rate  production  when the state has withdrawn,  how to prevent  pauperi- 
zation  when  the hoards  run  down, how to introduce  a spirit  of enterprise 
where it has been rooted out, or how to extract money from the West 
when it gets bored  and  the stabilization  fund  is used up. 
What  should  be the next steps? There  are  two points  that  run  counter 
to the duck  'a  la Bank  view. First, I think  we have to face up to the likeli- 
hood that, aside from  the simplest  economic activities, it will take much 
longer  for private  markets  to spring  up to replace  the state sector. Russia 
needs an industrial  policy to cope with the collapse of production  in key 
industries  like food, energy, transportation,  and exports. 
Second, I believe that  the major  republics  should  quickly  move to in- 
troduce independent  monies so that they can run their own monetary 
and fiscal policies. Each republic  should strive at least to have internal 
convertibility  between  currency  and  deposits. This will require  substan- 
tial  technical  assistance  from  the West, but the expertise  is available. 
The  move toward  fiscal  and  monetary  separation  and  the introduction 
of industrial  policies will solve none of the issues about  how to increase 
oil production  or achieve convertibility  of the fifteen or so currencies; 
however, it may at least prevent  the decline  into the Stone Age of barter 
that  is currently  under  way. Any chef that  can produce  that  outcome  de- 
serves four stars. 
General  Discussion 
Participants  generally agreed that issues of macro-stabilization  are 
better  understood  than  micro  issues, such as privatization  and  price  lib- 
eralization.  Michael  Bruno noted that a range of micro problems  have 
beset the transitions  in most Eastern  Europe  economies. However, the 
problems  are  even worse in the former  Soviet Union  because  of conflicts 
among  the republics  on issues as fundamental  as internal  payments  ar- 
rangements.  Robert  Hall stressed the need to reform  the financial  sys- 
tem, emphasizing  that a central  problem  was the moral  hazard  associ- 
ated with the government  controlling  the creation  of money. To avoid 
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units tied to an outside currency such as the deutsche mark, with the 
Bundesbank  controlling  the money supply  and remitting  seigniorage  to 
the republics.  Such an arrangement  would solve the problems  of con- 
vertibility  and  payments  arrangements  that  are otherwise so intractable 
for a primitive  economy. Hall suggested  that other important  micro  ob- 
jectives should include developing institutions outside the monetary 
system to intermediate  between lenders  and borrowers,  and  developing 
the systems of property  rights,  contract  enforcement,  and  dispute  settle- 
ments  that  a free enterprise  system requires.  Richard  Cooper  responded 
that an initiative  is already  underway  involving  Russian-speaking  U.S. 
lawyers  who are working  in Russia  to develop such a legal system. 
Several panelists  discussed the difficulties  of convertibility  raised in 
William Nordhaus' comments. Cooper observed that,  apart from 
blocked  enterprise  funds, which were never intended  to be used gener- 
ally, household  currency  deposits are essentially convertible  into cash. 
With  foreign  exchange markets  now free, Russians already  could con- 
vert their  rubles  into dollars.  However, Rudiger  Dornbusch  noted that, 
because no adequate  bank  clearing  system exists, such convertibility  is 
possible only in the form  of cash, which  greatly  limits  its usefulness. He 
offered this as one possible explanation  for why traders  have not done 
away with the "Hungarian  bus syndrome"  that Nordhaus described. 
Stanley Fischer acknowledged  the practical  difficulties  that limit  func- 
tional  convertibility,  even though  legal  convertibility  now exists. 
Lewis Alexander  suggested  that,  because most republics  are now try- 
ing to join the IMF, the obligations  of IMF membership,  as codified in 
the articles  of agreement,  could provide  a framework  for negotiating  re- 
forms in the monetary  system of those republics.  He suggested  that an 
historical  precedent  for this existed in the 1920s, in the role played by 
the reparations  commissions  that managed  the currency  separation  that 
followed the break-up  of the Austro-Hungarian  empire. Dornbusch, 
however, warned that the IMF would not have the power to force 
needed changes in the FSU and had no experience mediating  between 
countries  such as Russia  and Ukraine.  He reasoned  that solutions  to the 
basic problems  required  political  change and compromise.  Thus rather 
than relying  on the IMF to influence  policy in the FSU, the industrial 
nations should arrange  for a broadly  respected political  figure, such as 
Helmut Schmidt, to represent  their concerns with the highest level of 
political  decisionmakers  in the republics  of the FSU. Stanley Fischer  125 
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